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INTRODUCTION

Can a judge exercise discretion and follow the law? Some think it impossible, seeing discretion as the opposite of law. 2 Others have harmonized the
two ideas, viewing discretion as the exercise of judgment according to and
within the bounds of the law.3 Those who decry judicial discretion urge
legislatures to enact more specific laws and leave less room for the vice of
inconsistent results. Those who defend discretion would channel !it to
achieve the virtue of individualized justice.
The tension between individualization and uniformity in the law is often
4
unnecessarily heightened by an inadequate analysis of judicial discretion.
The exercise of judicial discretion in federal criminal sentencing exemplifies
the problems arising from those inadequate analyses. The Sentencing Reform Act of 19845 ("SRA") dramatically altered federal criminal sentencing
for the express purpose of controlling judicial discretion. 6 Judges were once
free to impose any sentence from probation to the statutory maximum and
were not subject to appellate review regarding the length of that sentence.
However, they are now bound by the Sentencing Guidelines 7 and subject to
appellate review of the sentences they impose. Despite this dramatic change,
or perhaps because of it, the Supreme Court has used the breadth and uncertainty of the concept of discretion to paper over the fundamental reallocation
of sentencing power in an effort to buttress the limited authority judges retain
to individualize sentences.
The Sentencing Guidelines include provisions which permit judges to ignore, or depart from, their requirements in some circumstances, 8 leaving an
island of individualized punishment in a sea of rule determined sentences. In

2 See id. ("'The Discretion Of A Judge Is The Law of Tyrants ....

') (quoting Lord

Camden). Kenneth Davis offered a more recent version of the same sentiment when he
wrote: "Where law ends, discretion begins." KENNETH DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3 (1969).
See generally Robert C. Post, The Management of

Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 169 n.3 (tracing the view that opposes

law and discretion, citing Packer, Dicey, Weber, Hayek, Dickinson, and Mashaw).
3 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977) (calling discretion the
"hole in the doughnut," arguing that it must always be understood in relation to rules or
standards that define its limits).

I See generally George Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747 (arguing
that we will always be ambivalent about discretion because it reflects the underlying tensions of regulating the exercise of power in a web of political relationships).
5 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559,
3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586, & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)).
6 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 37-39 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3220-22 (noting disparities in sentencing "can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers on ... judges").
7 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
8 See id. ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b).
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Koon v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court tried to map that island, adopting
an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing district court decisions to impose criminal sentences outside the range established by the Sentencing
Guidelines.' 0 Attempting to bolster the remnants of the once formidable judicial sentencing power, the Court looked to an assertedly "uniform and constant" tradition of judicial discretion to justify the abuse of discretion standard and protect the trial court's sentencing discretion under the
Guidelines."' The Court relied on an attractive linguistic symmetry to preserve the long tradition of sentencing discretion. Unfortunately, the linguistic symmetry masks deep doctrinal difficulties and a fundamentally flawed
effort to reinvigorate judicial sentencing power.
Although both the old and current systems have features properly called
"discretionary," they are very different systems of discretion. The old law
involved unreviewable and largely standardless judicial discretion, founded
on the model of individualized, rehabilitative sentencing. The current law
requires the exercise of judgment within a system of detailed rules, subject to
appellate review and founded on a compromise model of sentencing that
sometimes establishes several inconsistent goals. 12 The Court did not acknowledge the qualitative difference between old law discretion and Guidelines discretion in Koon, and cloaked its substantive choice of the individualized sentencing model in procedural dress. These twin flaws have only
deepened the rift between those who favor the application of the Guidelines
without exception in every case and those who favor individualized sentences.
Without tradition or agreement on initial principles to guide lower courts,
the Koon Court's adoption of the abuse of discretion standard without explanation of how to apply it has also deepened decisional inconsistency. While
one circuit uses Koon to affirm every district court decision to depart downward, another uses it to reverse every similar district court decision.13 The
immediate difficulties with Koon reflect the inherent inability of a procedural
ruling-the decision on the appropriate standard of review-to bring uni9 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
to See id. at 95 (holding that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of

district court decisions to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines and applying
that standard to reverse some departure grounds and affirm others in the case of the two
police officers convicted in the beating of Los Angeles motorist Rodney King).

I See id. at 109-12.
12 See GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 3 (asserting the Commission's goals of
honesty, uniformity and proportionality in sentencing).
13

The Second Circuit affirmed all the post-Koon downward departures they reviewed

between Koon and January 1998. The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh affirmed some
and reversed others while the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and District of
Columbia Circuits reversed every downward departure case they reviewed in that period.
See infra Part IV for a discussion of the circuit court cases.
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formity to this area of law.1 4 The procedural rule cannot resolve the continuing policy debate over the proper goals of criminal sentencing that led to
the significant political' 5 and doctrinal 16 compromises upon which the SRA
and the Sentencing Guidelines are founded. Criticism of the evolving SRA
regime must be tempered by an acknowledgment of the enormity of the
task. 17 However, ten years of experience with the current system suggests
that it is time for the appellate courts to look past the policy debate between
uniformity and individualization. Appellate courts must develop doctrines to
guide the practical resolution of those tensions, a task district courts undertake every time they consider a sentence under the Guidelines.
Koon was a step in the wrong direction. Although it may suit the Court's
purpose to use the common analytically blunt concept of discretion to
achieve a particular result, it does not advance doctrinal clarity or promote
uniform application of the law. Perhaps broad, theoretical statements about
the judicial power to exercise individual judgment may best be left to jurisprudence, but much remains to be said about the actual differences among
the kinds of discretion found in federal sentencing and what the differences
actually mean for sentencing courts.
This Article begins, in Part I, with an analysis of the facets of judicial discretion. Part II pays particular attention to the power to individualize sentences under the old sentencing regime and the changes wrought by the Sentencing Guidelines. Part III then shows that the abuse of discretion standard
of review in Koon was dictated neither by a tradition of sentencing discretion
nor the factual nature of the issue. Rather, the choice reflects the Court's
own adherence to a much more individualized model of sentencing than the
Sentencing Commission chose. In Part IV, the Article analyzes how the circuit courts have applied Koon, and argues that they too have continued the
14Others have argued that Koon cannot bring consistency to this area because it does

nothing to remedy the Commission's excessive control to define the legally permissible
bases for downward departure. See Kate Stith & Jose Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1278-79 (1997).
11See, e.g., Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 26173 (1993) (detailing the political debates involved in sentencing reform); David Yellen,
What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn from the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996
Wis. L. REV. 577, 585-90 (using the development of the federal guidelines to illustrate

how sentencing reform politics inevitably lead to harsher punishments).
16

See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-

mises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-31 (1988) (discussing six compromises and arguing that only one involved interests trading, while the others were rooted
in practical needs and unresolved theoretical issues).
17 Any sentencing reform must consider the number of criminal sentences imposed.
The Sentencing Commission reports that 42,436 federal criminal sentences were imposed
from October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996
ANN. REP. 32.
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debate over sentencing models, and have not developed a doctrine about how
and when district courts should use their limited discretion. This Article
concludes that the unexplicated abuse of discretion standard of review cannot
unify the law of district court sentencing departure. That approach has only
encouraged appellate courts to continue to debate policy, rather than focus
their attention on the more mundane task of adjudicating individual cases and
developing legal standards over time.
I.

DESCRIBING JUDICIAL DISCRETION: VARIETIES OF DISCRETION

There is an element of discretion in every exercise of judicial power that
does not flow from the obvious and mechanical application of a clear rule.
In addition, every exercise of appellate court power that gives any weight to
a lower court's ruling, whether pursuant to a clear rule or not, presents an
issue of judicial discretion in choosing what deference, if any, will be accorded to the lower court's decision. These two broad categories encompass
two very different kinds of judicial power. Examples from both the old and
current federal sentencing regimes illustrate these varieties of judicial discretion.
Before the SRA, federal criminal sentencing discretion was characterized
by almost completely individualized and unreviewable decision making. The
length of a federal criminal defendant's sentence was almost entirely in the
control of the district judge, 18 although a negotiated plea agreement 19 could
cap the possible sentence with a chosen statutory maximum. Further, prose-

18 See

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (commenting on the extent

of pre-guidelines discretion in the introduction to the decision affirming the constitutionality of the Guidelines). Of course, judicial sentencing discretion was restrained by statutory maximums, but as they were generally quite high relative to the expected range of
punishment and subject to manipulation by charging multiple counts, they rarely imposed
any consequential limits on sentences. Judicial power was also supposed to be moderated
by the parole board's power to release prisoners, but judges knew-and accounted for the
parole board's practices particularly after the promulgation of the parole guidelines. See
Stith & Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1248 (calling the impact of parole more apparent than
real after the promulgation of the parole guidelines). Judicial sentencing decisions also
faced procedural restrictions and the restraints of the very weak doctrine of proportionality
review (but these were very weak boundaries). See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
19 The Guidelines have changed, but not eliminated, sentence manipulation through plea
agreements. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the

Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamic in the PostMistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284 (1997) (arguing that the Guidelines have made
charging decisions more consistent, but prosecutors retain a considerable degree of sentencing discretion). For discussions of pre-guidelines plea bargaining, see Albert W.
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981)
(criticizing plea bargaining); PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND
NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT (1978) (defending plea bargaining).
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cutors and defense lawyers developed local customs to influence judges. 20 In
most cases, however, judges could impose any combination of fines and restrictions on liberty-from suspending the imposition of sentence 2l with or
without supervision by the probation department, to a sentence of imprisonment at the statutory maximum and the maximum authorized fine. Judges
were not required to state reasons for their sentences and "sentence[s] within
statutory limits [were], for all practical purposes, not reviewable on ap-

peal. "22
Although the SRA changed everything, there is still much within the new
system that is properly called discretionary. Today federal criminal sentencing discretion is characterized by a complex combination of reviewable
and non-reviewable exercises of judgment in applying rules and determining
when the rules may not apply. Sentences are determined by applying a complex body of rules that define a mandatory sentencing range for each offender, based upon the substantive conduct, the offender's criminal history
and other factors. 23 A judge must apply standards to choose a sentence
within that range, unless the case presents "circumstance[s] ... not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission."24 If the
20

The author practiced criminal law in two jurisdictions that did not have sentencing

guidelines. In both the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, before the Guidelines were in force,
it was common for the prosecutor to agree not to reveal certain information to the judge
(and the judges never directly sought that information) and to agree to take "no position"
on defense requests at sentence.
21 Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life
imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States when
satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant
will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems best. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1987), repealed by the SRA (applicable to offenses
committed prior to Nov. 1, 1987).
22 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (citing Dorszynski v. United States,
418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)). For a
discussion of the development of the doctrine of non-reviewability and its weakening

through increasing procedural scrutiny of federal sentencing by courts of appeals, see
Robert J. Kutak & J. Michael Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to
the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463 (1974) (demonstrating convincingly that courts of appeal occasionally used procedural dress to remand egregious sentences, but arguing for substantive appellate review of sentencing because the doctrine of
non-reviewability generally held firm and prevented the development of sentencing standards).
23 For a general discussion of the Sentencing Guidelines, see THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON
& DAVID YELLIN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE (1989); HARRY I. SUBIN,
CHESTER L. MIRSKY AND IAN S. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE ch. 10 (1992).
24 18 U.S.C. §3553(b); see also GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0.
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judge finds such circumstances, the court may depart from the Guidelines.
A sentence within the guideline range is not reviewable, 25 but any decision to
depart is reviewable. 26 Thus, the system combines discretion requiring rule
application to both non-reviewable and reviewable determinations.
In Koon, the Supreme Court followed longstanding practice in using
"discretion" to describe (1) the unreviewable, and essentially standardless,
pre-SRA exercise of sentencing power; (2) the unreviewable decision not to
depart, which is governed by both statute and guidelines; 27 and (3) the reviewable power, limited and defined by statute and guidelines, to depart
from the otherwise mandatory sentencing range. 28 Each of these three exercises of judicial power looks very different to a defendant and the defendant's lawyer thinking about the power of the particular judge to choose the
defendant's sentence.
Under the old sentencing law, lawyers were well advised to tell their clients that the actual sentence was "up to the judge," and whatever the judge
said would almost certainly be the final word on the matter. Today, however, a lawyer may explain that the judge has to decide whether the case fits
within any of the available legal categories for departure, and if it does,
whether the judge will choose to depart. The lawyer can also explain that
the law identifies the particular factors relevant to that decision, enabling the
lawyer to evaluate and advance arguments tailored to the law. A judge's decision will be final, assuming the judge recognized a legal basis for the decision. If the judge decides that there is no authority to depart, or chooses to
depart, the judge's decision is subject to review by a higher court, if the losing party seeks review. The judge's power is channeled by standards and
rules and sometimes subject to review, although much is still "up to the
judge."
Provisionally, we might say that the problem of judicial discretion is
measured by how much the result in the case turns upon who is making the
decision. If we are confident that the outcome will not be significantly different, regardless of the judge, then there is no problematic judicial discretion involved.2 9 If, on the other hand, we are not confident that the outcome
would be substantially the same if the decision were made by a different
judge or judges, then there is a significant element of problematic judicial
discretion involved.
Judicial discretion in this formulation is a problem if results should not
turn on the identity of the particular decision maker but on the application of
25

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(3) & (b)(3).

See id. §§ 3742(a)(3), (b)(3) & (0(2).
§ 3553(b) and GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 set out the standards judges
must apply when they evaluate a request for departure.
28 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
29 This formulation accounts for decisions that are not simply yes or no, but those that
require a judge to settle within a range, such as sentencing or awarding fees or damages.
26

27 18 U.S.C.
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a rule. Indeed, it is only an issue if a decision maker is bound by some
rules. As Ronald Dworkin put it, "The concept of discretion is at home in
only one sort of context; when someone is in general charged with making
decisions subject to standards set by a particular authority."30 Judges only
have discretion within a framework of rules that imposes limits on their
authority. The problem of discretion is the lack of certainty about those limits. To put it another way, absolute rulers deciding cases would not meaningfully be said to have judicial discretion. They simply have power to do as
they please and we do not think it inconsistent that their decisions would vary
from absolute ruler to absolute ruler. 3' But the law, not the identity of the
judge, ought to decide legal cases.
What happens when the judge must decide a question for which there is no
rule, or there is a rule but no clear answer, or there is no review to ensure
that the judge did, in fact, follow the rule? These are all cases in which the
result may turn on the judge rather than the law. The problem is controlling
decision making to ensure that the law-the constant from case to case-is
the decisive factor in the outcome. Maurice Rosenberg, the leading nonjurisprudential commentator on discretion, 32 captures this idea in stating that
a decision maker with discretion is "not bound to decide the question one
way" because "there is no officially wrong answer. " 33 Others have gone
further in opposing law and discretion by suggesting that discretion only
arises in cases where there is no law. 34 That view is too sharply dismissive
of what judges do and much of what we call law. Judges exercise discretion
within the constraining web of the law; the question is how tightly the web
binds and whether the spider has any. means for chasing down the fly who
occasionally wriggles free.
Commentators point to two distinct classes of cases in which judges have
discretion and where there is no authoritative way to officially pronounce.
30 DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 31. Dworkin's interest in discretion is part of his refutation of the positivist claim that when judges are not enforcing rules, they are using discretion (as opposed to law) to decide cases. He argues that positivists have missed the importance of principles and standards as enforceable sources of legitimate law. See id. at
34-39.
31 See George Fletcher, Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 269, 281-83 (1984) (calling this the difference between discretion and prerogative).
32 See Christie, supra note 4, at 747 (describing Rosenberg and Dworkin as the most
important and useful commentators on discretion).
33 Maurice Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971).
34 But see DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 31-32 (refuting this claim in the jurisprudential
sense); Post, supra note 2, at 208-11 (discussing the long perceived discomfort over how
to understand judicial decisions that are not clearly determined by application of a rule).
For another approach to the question of judicial judgment, see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL (1949) (arguing, among other things, that judicial decisions must be understood as
the product of the judge's particular psychological makeup).
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their decision wrong.3 5 In one group there are no official; legally correct answers; in the other group, the judge's choice will usually not be disturbed on
appeal. The cases in which there are no official answers permit judges to
decide the cases as they see fit. This is "primary" or "decision-liberating"
discretion. 36 Judges have the greatest primary discretion when applicable legal standards do not exist and the least when specific rules to the kinds of
37
cases for which the rules were intended do exist.
In the other class of cases, there may be official answers, but the judge's
choice will, rarely, if ever, be disturbed on appeal, because the decision is
unreviewable or the judge's choice is given deference by the reviewing
court. This is "secondary" or "review-limiting" discretion. 38 This form
presents the appellate procedural issues of reviewability and standards of review familiar to all appellate judges and lawyers. Secondary discretion
ranges from completely unreviewable decisions to de novo review of lower
court decisions and various levels in between. 39
Much confusion has come from the failure to recognize the independence
of, and the differences between, decision-liberating and review-limiting discretion. Any court subject to review 4° may have any combination of each
kind of discretion. For example, the trial court and appellate court would
both have primary (i.e., decision-liberating) discretion in deciding and reviewing, respectively, a decision to award counsel fees governed solely by a
statute that states the decision is "in the discretion of the court." Absent any
other law, each court would have no official standards to apply. If the trial
court's decision were also reviewable "in the discretion of the court," the
trial court would have no secondary (i.e., review-limiting) discretion because
the reviewing court would not give any deference to the trial court's deci-

3 See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 33 (cautioning us not to confuse a judge's power regarding discretion with being beyond criticism). For example, even if a judge may not be
reversed, or even reviewed, the judge may still be subject to criticism.
36 Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 637; see also DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 31-32; Post,
supra note 2, at 210-11.
37 See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 31-32; Post, supra note 2, at 210-211; Rosenberg,
supra note 33, at 637.
31 See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 638; DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 32.
39 See generally STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS
OF REVIEW (1986) (two volume treatise on standards of review in the federal courts). See

infra notes 180-82 for discussion of the abuse of discretion standard.
40 Courts of last resort-the United States Supreme Court or State Supreme Courtsruling on questions of state law cannot properly be said to have judicial discretion in
Dworkin's view, because there is no higher controlling authority. Their decisions may be
changed by legislative action or constitutional amendment, which illustrates how those
courts also exercise an essentially political authority, checked by non-judicial mechanisms.
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sion. In this example, both courts would have primary 41discretion and the
appellate court would have complete secondary discretion.
A lower court may also have complete secondary discretion in an area
governed by well-established standards. For instance, a trial court's decision
to grant a criminal defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close
of the prosecution's case is controlled by a clear standard, 42 but is unreviewable.

43

The Supreme Court has addressed review-limiting, or secondary discretion, in cases like Koon that require the Court to choose among the three existing standards of appellate review. 44 The Court has developed a largely
functional jurisprudence of review-limiting discretion, using general considerations to arrive at case by case judgments about the proper allocation of
45
authority in each case.
The general rules for the proper exercise of primary, or decision-liberating
discretion, are never at issue for decision by the Court. The law does not
41 The doctrine of independent review of certain facts in First Amendment cases pro-

vides an example of this rather atypical situation. The lower court must, in the end, make
an individualized judgment even about constitutional facts, which judgment is then reviewable de novo on appeal. See Henry Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 229 (1985) (discussing the lack of deference to lower court fact application to the
legal issue of malice).
42 The judge may grant a motion for a judgment of acquittal prior to submission of the
case to the jury, pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a), if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, no jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Hazeem, 679 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir.
1982).
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994) ("[N]o appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution."). In contrast, a
motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(b) or (c), after a guilty
verdict, is reviewable because the jury verdict may simply be reinstated and no second
trial is required. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70
(1977) (holding that double jeopardy does not bar government appeal of a grant of motion
for judgment of acquittal where reversal would only require reinstatement of a jury verdict
and not a new trial).
44 "All appellate Gaul ... is divided into three parts: review of facts, review of law,
and review of discretion." Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 173 (1978). Questions of law are subject to de novo review, questions of facts are subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard and questions denominated matters of discretion are subject to review for abuse of discretion. See
generally CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 39, §§ 101-04 (providing an introductory discussion of standards of review, emphasizing the malleability of the abuse of discretion
standard).
41 See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399-403 (1990)
(discussing the choice of standards and emphasizing the difficulty of distinguishing law
from fact); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558-63 (1988) (citing Rosenberg in the
Court's discussion of choosing the applicable standard of review).
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govern judges' cognitive processes, only the results they reach. Many cases
offer models of how the Supreme Court exercises judicial judgment in the
absence of clear rules, however, the general rules for the exercise of decision-liberating discretion are left to jurisprudence. Although reasoning by
analogy is at the heart of the common law method for applying the results of
one case governed by standards to another case involving the same standards, 46 no rules specify when or how this method should be applied.
Commentators agree on the important distinction between decisionliberating and review-limiting discretion, but they continue to seek some unifying idea undergirding judicial discretion. Rosenberg's view that discretion
signifies choice 47 is probably the leading candidate, but it suggests too simple
a view of discretion. Although situations of completely unreviewable secondary discretion and completely standardless primary discretion are centrally
about choice, discretion also involves choices that are neither completely free
nor wholly beyond the judge's control. Post has made this point in criticizing both Rosenberg and the Supreme Court for identifying discretion with
choice and opposing those two notions with the idea of law and rules. He
writes:
[Rosenberg] invites us to conceptualize choice as a single, unitary act
that is either free or constrained, rather than as a complex process. Our
judicial system contains numerous examples of decision making that is
both discretionary and guided by legal standards. But since we have no
disciplined method to bring these examples easily to mind, we do not
use them in analysis of unfamiliar circumstances .... 48
Post goes on to offer an analysis of how discretion, as choice, interacts with
rules in several dimensions of decision making and review. 49 He is right in
observing that many situations combine some range of choices with standards
or processes that shape the choice in the particular case. Discretion is often
more about how choice is constrained, not simply whether the judge has
choice. Post's "viewpoint discretion," 50 which analyzes the interrelationship
of choice and constraint from the viewpoint of trial (as opposed to appellate)
judging, captures the task judges face when they have discretion limited by
standards and review, but does not address instances of complete nonreviewability, 5 1 or cases in which there is simply no officially wrong answer.

52

16 See Cass Sunstein, Commentary on Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741
(1993) (calling analogy the "most familiar form of legal reasoning" and analyzing its use
in appellate opinions).
4 See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 636.
48 Post, supra note 2, at 207.
49 See id. at 209-10.
50 Id. at 209-13.
s Post shares Dworkin's lack of interest in nonreviewable decisions, arguing that trial
judges, even when their decisions are not reviewable, cannot make decisions by flipping a
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In cases of complete non-review, the trial judge's choice will decide the
case. When judges must evaluate substantive standards according to procedural rules, their decision making is much more complex than the simple
idea that choice captures. But where there are no standards or review, the
judge may simply choose what to do. That choice may be informed by law,
or it may not, 53 but it will decide the case. For a litigant in a case where
there is no standard or review (or review so weak that it makes a change in
result a practical impossibility), the trial judge has significant power. There
is no official way to say that the law, not the judge, decided the case.
Thus choice, as a unitary act of deciding between one result or another, is
at the heart of complete review-limiting discretion, but it does not capture
much of the complexity of review or decision-liberating discretion. 54 Rosenberg's discussion of choice better explains the absence of review, while Post
highlights how we can analyze the actual review undertaken in a particular
kind of case. Neither can account for both, nor does Rosenberg's choice
model explain why choice may be given to the judge.
The functional view of discretion, first offered in the administrative law
setting by Davis, suggests that review-limiting discretion reflects decisions

coin. See id. at 210. "He might instead feel himself bound to choose the appropriate legal
policies ... and to do his best to implement them." Id. Thus, for Post, the trial judge
has unalterable choice from the viewpoint of the appellate court, but from the trial court's
own perspective, its choice is (assumedly) guided by standards.
52 Because Post is interested in the -situation in which there are standards that leave
some room for judgment, he does not discuss the complete absence of standards. Discretion as the absence of standards, however, is most important to Dworkin's refutation of the
positivist. Thinking about the discretion of a decision maker who is subject to standards
set by authority, Dworkin identifies three "gross distinctions." DWORKIN, supra note 3, at
31. He identifies two kinds of "weak discretion," id. at 32, one in which the application
of standards requires exercise of judgment and the other in which the decision is unreviewable. For Dworkin's arguments, the two forms of weak discretion are trivial, because
neither exercise of judgment nor institutional arrangements speak to the place of principle
as law.
The third category is "strong discretion," when the decision maker is simply not bound
by standards set by the authority in question. See id. Dworkin questions whether in hard
cases where the rules do not provide a clear decision, if judges must fall back upon strong
discretion, or if they are bound by principle to reach a particular conclusion. See id. at
33. He denies the positivist claim that such decisions are discretionary in the strong sense,
and famously constructs his richer legal toolkit. See id. at 34-39.
53 But see Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 22, at 486-87 (discussing exceptions to the
non-review doctrine under which cases viewed as unjust still receive review).
54 Childress & Davis capture this distinction in the context of review of administrative
agency decisions by labeling situations of non-review or no standards "true discretion" and
cases involving reviewable judgments about the application of standards as involving
"guided discretion." See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 39, § 15.08.
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about allocation of authority. 55 Davis analyzes the discretion held by nonjudicial actors, whose authority is limited by rules and the degree of review
of the application of those rules. 56 In that context it seems quite natural to
ask functional questions about the allocation of authority.
Pound's view of discretion as the individualizing agent in the law also focuses on the outcome. 57 He questions who has the final say and what criteria
that authority may use, by offering a historical gloss that traces the emergence of discretion from growing dissatisfaction with the harsh results of imposing the letter of the law.58 His view considers the value individualized
justice can have in discretionary decision making. 59
. Davis and Pound remind us that judicial discretion is both necessary and
desirable. It is necessary because we cannot have a rule directly on point for
every situation, nor can every decision reasonably be reviewed by a higher
authority. It is desirable because it permits rules to be modified to fit individual cases. In a new, undeveloped area, the wisdom of the common law
may emerge if enough individual decisions coalesce around a principle to
permit the development of more precise rules. 6°
With that justification in mind, we might return to the provisional view
that the problem of judicial discretion is measured by how much the result in
the case turns upon who is making the decision. Many minor, procedural
decisions that constitute the day to day exercise of generic judicial discretion
are unreviewable and standardless, but there is little variation from judge to
judge. These decisions do not often turn upon who is making the decision
and they are efficiently left to discretion.
The class of potentially problematic cases is that in which judges have discretion on a dispositive issue and, hence, arguably similar cases are not decided alike. Pound's view of discretion as the individualizing agent in the
law reminds us that there are two possible explanations for the variations.
One is the problematic answer that the results turn on the identity of the
judge. The other possibility is that the difference is in the cases. The prob51 See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 215-16 (suggesting that the entire legal system "find
ways to minimize discretionary injustice").
56 See id. at 219.
57 See Pound, supra note 1, at 937.

58 See id. at 926-30 (tracing the history of the powers of discretion, dispensation and
mitigation).
19 See id.
60 Rosenberg suggests that this happens when a novel situation arises and appellate
courts bide their time to see what factors emerge. See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 662-

63 He sees that as a more easily remedied subclass of the more general problem of cases
for which rules are difficult to frame. See id. Rules are more difficult to frame when the
issue presents "multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization." Id. at 662. Sentencing under the Guidelines presents both types of questions-some
novel but amenable to rules, and some too detailed for the development of unified appellate doctrine.
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lem is not that judges sometimes have choices. Choice is a necessary result
of the imperfect fit between our world and the inadequate rules we can create
for it. The problem is controlling the choices so cases meriting individualized consideration can receive it. These cases should receive consistent standards so the outcomes do not turn on which judge hears the cases.
Viewed under this test, the new sentencing law replaced a system that was
fairly criticized for failing to exert any control. The system had a large element of problematic discretion in sentencing. However, the Supreme Court
has continued the legacy of problematic discretion by relying on those years
of non-review, when no consistent standards existed, to inform the new regime of guided discretion. The Supreme Court's current rule on discretionary sentencing still fails the second part of the discretion test. Although the
first part is met by providing consistent standards courts can apply, outcomes
continue to turn on who does the judging.
II.

FROM UNFETTERED CHOICE TO LIMITED DISCRETION

Under the old sentencing law, federal judges had a great deal of primary
discretion and virtually complete secondary discretion to determine sentences. Beyond the statutory maximums, no promulgated standards guided
the exercise of sentencing discretion and no appellate review existed to opine
on the length of the sentences imposed. 61 So long as the sentence was under
the maximum limit and was procedurally proper, the judge was not subject to
review and could not be reversed. For example, in the case of a bank robber, the judge could suspend sentence or send the defendant to prison for
twenty-five years. Few other decisions of such moment were left to the trial
court without the possibility of review.
Non-reviewability 62 is the strongest form of secondary discretion. 63 Because there was no review of sentencing, the Supreme Court had no choice
but to defer to the trial court. 64 It had little opportunity to express its view
61 See

supra notes 18, 21 & 22 and accompanying text. These decisions were not com-

pletely standardless, only standardless in an important practical sense. The statutory
maximums provided no real limits in the vast majority of cases where the sentence did not
approach the maximum.
62 The non-review doctrine may well have been founded on a mistake, but became well
entrenched by the 1930s. See Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 22, at 468-72 (tracing the
history of the doctrine of non-review of sentences and suggesting it was founded on a misreading of the law); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals:
A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (1997)
(discussing the doctrine of non-review).
63 See supra note 51 (identifying non-reviewability as Dworkin's second type of weak
discretion).

I See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (noting that, unlike the English
and Scottish courts of appeals, the Supreme Court does not have the power to increase or
reduce sentences).
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on sentencing and could only caution against invading the legislative prerogative and entering the field of penology. 65 The Court also suggested that
the sentencing court is in the best position to make a sentence determination
because of its familiarity with the case. 66 Of course, the failure to develop
principled justifications is a key feature of non-review. 67
How much primary (i.e., decision-liberating) discretion did judges have
under the old law? Statutory maximums imposed some limits on sentences.
A judge could only enjoy complete, unbounded choice in sentencing in the
case of a life maximum, without any mandatory minimum. Generally, how-

ever, within the statutory maximums, the relevant authority promulgated no
governing rules or standards. Statutes provided no guidance beyond the
vaguest nostrums, 68 and appellate courts had virtually no opportunity to
guide sentencing courts because they never reviewed sentences. 69 This system developed to advance the goal of rehabilitation, 70 which required sentences tailored to each individual's particular background and needs. 7' Old
law sentencing also offered an example of a strong form of primary, or decision-liberating discretion. Any sentence under the maximum was legally

65

See id. (commenting that decisions about severity of punishment are "peculiarly

questions of legislative policy").
66 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932) (noting that although the
sentence "seems unduly severe," the trial court may have facts before it justifying its sentencing decision and the Supreme Court cannot disturb the sentence).
67 Norval Morris, a principal voice for sentencing reform, advocated appellate review
of sentences to develop a "common law of sentencing." Reitz, supra note 64, at 1448
(quoting Norval Morris, Toward Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 284
(1977)).
68 See Reitz, supra note 62, at 1445.
69 See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1252.
70 The development of the parole system, introduced in 1910, provided some check on
judicial sentencing and offered another avenue for the rehabilitation theory to guide criminal sentencing. Parole gave executive branch officials the authority to evaluate each prisoner's progress toward rehabilitation. See Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 227. Individualized release determinations were supposed to reflect the inmate's progress. See id.
Parole decisions were non-judicial determinations guided by standards and subject to limited review. See id. Sentences actually served were not completely at the discretion of
judges, but judges learned to account for parole in sentencing, see supra note 20, and there
was no systematic mechanism for feedback to judges. Sentencing decisions remained uninformed by experience beyond the particular lessons each individual judge might believe
he or she had learned over time.
71See id. at 227 (discussing the rise and fall of the rehabilitative model); see also Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American Justice
at the End of the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 506 nn.7-10 (1997) (reviewing
MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995),

and citing authors on each side of the rehabilitation and retribution debate).
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correct because there were no rules, standards or guidelines governing the
72
particular sentence to be imposed.
Dworkin's reminder-that judicial discretion asks whether the judge was
accountable according to a standard furnished by a particular authority and
still admits of the possibility of criticism based on sense, fairness or other
criteria, 73-highlights the problem with judicial discretion under the old law.
Judges were subject to "unofficial criticism" from all angles, 74 but not to an
official check on their exercise of judicial power. Interest groups espoused
varying views about the proper goals and methods of punishment, subjecting
every sentencing decision to potential criticism. Each judge was on his or
her own when sentencing, 75 because the lack of standards and non-review
left the judge without a supporting body of sentencing case law.
Old law discretionary sentencing gave federal judges unreviewable and,
within the statutory maximum, standardless power to choose the punishment
in a given case. All that has changed with the SRA. The movement for
sentencing reform began in the 1970s. 76 That movement criticized the standardless, unreviewable sentencing regime as lawless and subject to the prejudices and whims of individual judges. 77 Critics focused on extremely harsh
sentences for relatively minor offenses, 78 urged increasing use of alternatives
to incarceration, 79 and sought appellate review to prevent judges from favoring white and middle class defendants at the expense of people of color. 80
72

Further dissection of this exercise of judicial authority under Dworkin's scheme of

strong versus weak discretiondepends on the characterization of the question. The overall
sentencing decision was bounded by a standard-the maximum sentence and fine set out in
the statute. Thus, the judge exercised weak discretion. But the real decision, given that in
many cases the maximum is far in excess of the probable sentence and defendants are
more concerned with how short the sentence may be, was not governed by any standards
directing the choice of the particular sentence under the maximum. In an important sense,
and from the perspective of the parties and the judge, the old law decision about the actual
length of the sentence is an example of Dworkin's strong discretion. See DwORKIN, supra
note 3, at 31-34.
71 See id. at 31.
74 See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 5-25 (1973) (criticizing discretionary sentencing and the way his colleagues on the federal bench exercised their power); see
also Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 227-30 (analyzing the growing debate over rehabilitative sentencing during the early 1970s).
71 See FRANKEL, supra note 74, at 61-85 (discussing the occasional use of sentencing
institutes to educate judges and sentencing counsels to control sentencing).
76 Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 230-33 (recounting the early history of sentencing reform); see also Reitz, supra note 62, at 1447-48 (noting the "reformist vision" of the early
movement to change sentencing).
77 See Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 231.
78 See FRANKEL, supra note 74, at 17-23.
79 See Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 231.
80 See id.
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Stith & Koh and Yellen tell different versions of the political tale of how
that liberal 1970s movement yielded a 1980s legislative alliance with conservative law and order interests. Riding the "crime wave" and controlling the
legislative process, conservative interests met the demands of their liberal allies for rules and reviewability, while achieving their goals of lengthening
criminal sentences and eliminating the rehabilitative model of criminal sentencing. 8' The SRA and the introduction of mandatory minimum narcotics
sentences brought about a complete restructuring of federal criminal sentencing made possible by, and reflecting, a classic political compromise.
Although its diverse supporters agreed that the discretion of sentencing
judges should be reined in, they did not agree on why or what goal the new
system should pursue. As a compromise, they simply listed several general
goals and "remained agnostic" on choosing an underlying philosophy of
82
sentencing.

Although the failure to decide on an underlying philosophy is problematic,
more immediately troublesome is the contradiction inherent in the stance on
individualization of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.83 The statute directs

sentencing courts to consider "(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; ... [and] (6) the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct . . . . "8 Judges
have a statutory mandate to continue to individualize sentences as they did
under the old law. However, that mandate is now balanced against a directive that those individualized sentences should not vary too much from those
of similarly situated defendants. One way to view that tension is to ask what
See id. at 232-48 (tracing the results of the political compromise between Senators
Kennedy and McClellan); see also Yellen, supra note 15, at 585-90 (drawing a cautionary
lesson from the history of the sentencing reform movement and warning advocates of systemic reform of the juvenile justice system that political pressure to be tough on crime can
overwhelm any other reform agenda).
82 See Kevin Cole, Ten Years Later: The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997) (arguing that the Commission's failure to make fundamental theoretical choices makes the goal of reducing disparity incoherent).
83 The Guidelines send a "mixed message," with some elements highlighting judicial
individualization and other elements encouraging uniformity through uniform application
of the Commission's rules. See Reitz, supra note 62, at 1462; see also Albert W.
Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less Aggregation, 58 U.
Cm. L. REV. 901, 902 (1991) (analyzing the conflicting provisions and arguing for more
individualization); Daniel Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1744-45, 1749-52
(1992) (analyzing the conflicting provisions and arguing for greater judicial power to individualize); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the FederalSentencing Process: The Problem
is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 870 (1992) (calling for more
individualization within the Guidelineg system).
84 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (6) (1994).
81

510
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8 5 Ulis unwarranted, as opposed to warranted, disparity among defendants.
timately, we should determine what matters when we ask whether one bank
robber should receive the same sentence as another bank robber.
The Sentencing Commission, the body charged with answering that question, based its answer on an empirical analysis of past sentencing practices.
At the heart of the Guidelines is a statistical analysis of about 110,000 federal criminal sentences, which identified statistically significant factors in
historical sentencing practices. 86 The Commission then wrote guidelines designed to impose statistically average sentences for cases involving the identified factors. 87 If a factor did not occur with sufficient frequency, the Commission omitted the factor from the Guidelines, assuming that judges would
88
individualize sentences in cases that presented atypical factors.
The Commission suggests that the empirical approach "helped resolve its
philosophical dilemma" 89 of choosing between those who advocated "just deserts" 9° and those who advocated crime control because both groups might
"recognize the wisdom of looking to those distinctions that judges and legislators have, in fact, made over the course of time. These established distinctions are ones that the community believes, or has found over time, to be
important from either a just deserts or crime control perspective."91 Many
have criticized the Commission's averaging of philosophical positions, 92 its
use of past practices motivated by a wider variety of goals, principally rehabilitation, to answer a narrower and largely empirical question, and the in93
sensitivity of its empirical measures to individual differences.

81 See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 915-16.
86 See Breyer, supra note 16, at 7 & n.50.
87 See GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmts. 3, 5.
88
89

See id.
Id. cmt. 3.

o Id. The Manual defines just deserts as "punishment ...
pability and the resulting harms." Id.
91

scaled to the offender's cul-

Id.

I See, e.g., Cole, supra note 82, at 1336 (identifying the Commission's failure to make
principled choices as the cause of doctrinal disarray in Guidelines jurisprudence); Cass
Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1743-44 (1995)
(citing sentencing guidelines as an example of making laws with low-level agreement on
practical issues, rather than more general agreement on principles).
93 These problems were evident to perceptive early critics. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra
note 83; Freed, supra note 83; Schulhofer, supra note 83. The Commission recognized
the choice it made and included this language in the text of the Guidelines:
The guidelines will not please those who wish the Commission to adopt a single
philosophical theory and then work deductively to establish a simple and perfect set of
categorizations and distinctions. The guidelines may prove acceptable, however, to
those who seek more modest, incremental imprgvements in the status quo, who believe the best is often the enemy of the good, and who recognize that these guidelines
are, as the Act contemplates, but the first step in an evolutionary process.
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The Commission did not just average past practices, it developed models
of the factors judges used to individualize sentences by asking what particular conduct impacted sentencing for each offense. 94 For example, in the
typical bank robbery, defendants who used a gun generally received higher
sentences, than defendants who did not, so gun use was considered as an offense characteristic meriting harsher sentences. 95 Where the data indicated
that a particular feature did not have statistically significant sentencing consequences, or did not occur often enough, the Commission did not include
the factor as an offense characteristic.
The Commission did, however, permit consideration of unusual conduct
through departures. 96 For example, although most immigration offenses do

not involve guns, and thus the relevant guideline does not mention guns, the
Commission expects judges to depart upward for gun use in immigration offenses. The empirical approach drove decisions about the "heartland" of offense conduct relevant to sentencing a given offense. 97 Identification of that
heartland is key to defining the situations in which judges may depart from
98
the Guidelines.

GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 3. The first edition of the Sentencing Guidelines
Manual contained that language, and ten years later the same language and the same basic
guidelines remain in force. Despite some 544 amendments, the Guidelines structure has
not changed. Yet the idea of evolutionary change and perfectability remains a powerful
illusion at the heart of the Guidelines. The Commission disavows adopting a single philosophical perspective and uses the rhetoric of pragmatic flexibility, ready to respond to new
information and changing circumstances. In fact, its continued use of average past sentences, without parole, reflects a choice of an empirical measure of historical practices as
its fundamental guiding philosophy, despite statutory directives to balance reducing disparity with other goals. The rigidity of the Guidelines over the first ten years belies its
pragmatic rhetoric.

I See

GUIDELINES MANUAL

ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4.

95 The Commission used this example when discussing the desirability of a "real offense" system. See id. cmt. 4(a).
96 See id. cmt. 4(b) (describing the Commission's view regarding when a departure is
warranted).
9 The Commission's decision that very few characteristics of the offender, rather than
the conduct of the offense, would be ordinarily relevant was the result of more traditional
political trade offs among commissioners and was not empirically driven. Congress empowered the Commission to consider the relevance of a range of characteristics, including
age, education, vocational skills, physical condition including drug dependence, family ties
and responsibilities, and community ties. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1994). The Commission made all of those factors not "ordinarily relevant" in the Guidelines. GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5Hl.I ("Introductory Comments"); see also Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at
249-50, 283 (asserting that the Commission was not required by law to make most indi-

vidual characteristics not ordinarily relevant).
98 See GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b).
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The Guidelines themselves have completely changed the exercise of judicial discretion in federal sentencing. 99 Under the Guidelines, judges make
legal determinations about the applicability of rules-the particular Guidelines sections-to the case at hand. This is the familiar application of law to
facts, the archetypal exercise of the judicial craft. It often requires the exercise of judgment, i.e., Dworkin's weak discretion of the first type, l°° but the
Guidelines reflect an effort to draft a comprehensive set of detailed rules designed to leave few hard cases. Those legal decisions about which rules are
applicable in a given case, and how they are to be applied, are reviewable on

99 At the same time 'that Congress adopted a set of mandatory guidelines, it also passed
mandatory minimum drug sentences which effectively took 40% of the cases out of the

new sentencing regime and made guidelines sentencing impossible in those cases. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 563 (1999) (discussing the impact of mandatory minimum sentences). This
defect has received much comment. See JONATHON P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND DRUG
POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, MANDATORY DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR
THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY 124-26, 143-44 (1997) (arguing that mandatory minimums are

not cost effective); U.S.

SENTENCING COMM. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 34-35 (1991) (noting conflicts between the Guidelines

and mandatory minimums).
The expansion of mandatory minimum sentences shifted significant discretion to determine sentences from judges to prosecutors. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial
Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 105, 107 (1994). The prosecutor's charging decisions determine the applicability of
mandatory minimums and can determine the applicable guidelines. See generally Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 19, at 1284 (discussing plea bargaining under the Guidelines).
The prosecutor's decision to certify the defendant's "substantial assistance," GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K. 1.1, can take the case below the sentencing guidelines range. See Cynthia
K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor'sExpanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199-201 (1997)
(noting that if the government "files a motion requesting downward-departure, the court
may depart and impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range"). Furthermore,
"evidence exists that prosecutors sometimes use plea bargaining to manipulate or circumvent the Guidelines." Id. at 236. Others have argued that power has shifted to Congress.
See, e.g., James B. Burns et al., We Make the Better Targets (But the Guidelines Shifted
Powerfrom the Judiciaryto Congress, Not from the Judiciary to the Prosecution), 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1997).
Congress took a small step away from mandatory minimums when it passed the "safety
valve" provision in 1994. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994). This statute permits judges to
sentence low level, non-violent first time narcotics offenders to a sentence within the
Guidelines, but below the mandatory minimum. See generally Philip Oliss, Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1851 (1995).
1o See supra note 52.

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1999]

appeal.' 0 ' Federal criminal sentencing, once an exercise of unreviewable individual judgment, now looks much more like the rest of judging.
Once those legal determinations are made, two areas of discretion as judicial choice remain. The first is the unreviewable authority to decide where
in the applicable range to sentence the defendant. 10 2 By statute, the maximum sentence, or top of the range, cannot exceed the minimum sentence, or
bottom of the range, by more than the greater of either twenty-five percent
or six months.103 That area of choice is clearly defined and presents most of
the primary and all of the secondary (i.e., nonreviewable) discretion left to
sentencing judges in the roughly seventy percent of the cases sentenced
within the applicable guideline range. 104
The roughly thirty percent of the cases sentenced outside the Guidelines
fall into two groups. Two thirds of the cases outside the range, or just under
twenty percent of all cases, 0 5 were sentenced outside the Guidelines because
the defendants provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of others.l°6 Only the prosecutor can trigger these departures, 0 7 but
once the government requests a substantial assistance departure, the extent of
the departure is up to the judge. In those cases, the judge has unreviewable
10 8
(i.e., complete secondary) discretion over the length of the sentence.
Moreover, judges also have moderate primary discretion in these cases be-

101 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
102 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(3) & (b)(3) (authorizing appeal of any sentence below or
above the range, but not for any sentence within the range absent any other reason).
103 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1994).
statutory mandate to measure the
104 The creation of the Sentencing Commission and its
effectiveness of the Guidelines system, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(C) & (b)(2), has resulted in a tremendous wealth of readily available data. The Commission publishes annual
reports each year and maintains an extensive data base of collected data. In the 1996 fiscal
year, October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996, a total of 42,436 sentences were imposed under the Guidelines; 69.6% of the cases were sentenced within the guideline range.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 ANN. REP. 34 (1997).
105In fiscal 1996, 19.2% of all the sentences involved departures on account of substantial assistance in the prosecution of others. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996
ANN. REP. 34 (1997).
106 See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1. These substantial assistance departures can be
very significant in narcotics cases, where they are usually paired with motions to sentence
below the mandatory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); Melendez v. United States, 518
U.S. 120, 124-31 (1996) (holding that a government motion to depart from the Guidelines
does not confer authority upon the court to ignore the mandatory minimum; a separate
motion pursuant to § 3553(e) is required); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES

(1997) (reporting statistical evidence suggesting the

extent of the departures may vary with race, gender, and other problematic factors).
107

See

GUIDELINES MANUAL

10sSee id.§ 5K1.1.(a).

§ 5KI.1.
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cause the Guidelines spell out the factors to consider in evaluating the defendant's cooperation. 109
In the remaining cases," l0 the judges exercised their authority, subject to
appellate review, and found the cases unusual enough to require sentencing
outside the guideline scheme. This group of non-substantial assistance departures"' represents what remains of the completely unfettered primary
sentencing discretion once enjoyed by federal judges.
The proper exercise of the remnants of what was once a much greater
power has been a matter of contention since the Guidelines were first proposed. The decision to make the Guidelines mandatory, but permit departures in some cases, was a compromise between proponents and opponents of
judicial discretion. 112 Congress decided that judges should have the authority
to sentence outside the Guidelines in some cases. The statute requires that:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described.' '3

109 See id. § 5Kl.1.(a)(1)-(5) (providing a non-exhaustive list of factors courts may
consider).
110 In fiscal 1996, 11.2% of all cases were not sentenced within the Guidelines for rea-

sons other than substantial assistance, 10.3% of all cases involved a downward departure,
and 0.9% involved an upward departure. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 ANN.
REP. 34-35 (1997).
III The 0.9% of all cases involving upward departures are not discussed in this Article.
Upward departures are governed by a separate set of more restrictive principles. They
most often involve cases in which the defendant's criminal history under represents his
true past criminal conduct. Such upward departures are structured by reference to the
criminal history rules. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (providing standards for upward
departures when the defendant's criminal history category does not truly reflect his or her
criminal history); Michael Gelacek et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: An Empirical and JurisprudentialAnalysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 339
(1996) (analyzing pre-Koon upward departures). The very small number of upward departure cases, compared to the almost 30% sentenced below the guideline range, suggests
that many judges believe the Guidelines are generally harsh enough and need to be moderated with leniency.
112 See Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 271-73.
113 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). Commentators have debated whether § 3553(b) is the
only statutory provision authorizing departure, although courts (including the Supreme
Court in Koon) have not taken up the invitation to use other provisions. Compare Judy
Clarke & Gerald McFadden, Departuresfrom the Guideline Range: Have We Missed the
Boat, or Has the Ship Sunk?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 919, 921-31 (1992) (reading other
sections of the SRA as granting independent and broader authority to depart), with Gelacek
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The Commission's approach to departures shows that it narrowly interpreted this directive and other statutory language favoring individualized decision making and judicial discretion. 114 That approach flowed from the
Commission's strong reliance on the empirical data. Taking the position that
it had captured most, if not all, of the factors judges relied upon, the Commission saw little room for individualization. Put another way, the Commission viewed sentencing as largely reduced to general principles, spelled out
in the Guidelines, requiring little need for individualizing.
III. KOON v.UNITED STATES
We all have come to know the awful story of the beating of Rodney King
by several Los Angeles police officers. 115 In Koon v. United States, 116 the
government appealed the sentences imposed on two of the officers involved
in the beating who were convicted of federal charges."17 The case presented
the question of whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit was correct when it gave no deference to the trial court's decision to
depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines."18 The Supreme Court
ruled that the circuit court should have deferred to the trial court under an
abuse of discretion standard. 119 The Court encouraged giving trial courts
greater discretion to individualize sentences because the sentencing decision
is, and always has been, an inherently individualized factual judgment.' 20
However, what the Court treats as a fact about the "nature" of sentencing
is actually the very issue requiring resolution. At the heart of the problem is
the need to find the right degree of individualization within the system of
rule-determined, uniform sentencing introduced by the Guidelines. The
Court conflated the limited discretion of the Guidelines-which intended to
balance individualized sentencing with the need to reduce disparity-with the
old tradition of complete discretion, which individualized sentences without
any countervailing goal. The analysis of the "factual nature" of sentencing
masks the Court's refusal to grapple with the difficult job of defining the
limits of individualized sentencing within the Guidelines.

et al., supra note 111, at 318-28 (arguing that § 3553(b) is the sole statutory authority for
departures).
114 See Gelacek et al., supra note 111, at 319-22 (arguing for a narrow reading of §
3553(b)); Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 284 (stating that the Commission has chosen rigidity over flexibility).
"I See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 85-88 (1996) (reciting the account of
King's beating).
116 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
117See id. at 88.
118See id. at 91.
119 See

id.

120 See id. at 96-100.
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If the issue is simply the appropriate standard of review of an inherently
factual judgment, then it is only a short step to the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review and deferential but individualized appellate analysis of each departure. But the adoption of the malleable abuse of discretion
standard offers little guidance as to how deferential that review should be.
The old system of unreviewed and standardless sentencing upon which the
Court relied offers no guidance. Nor can courts rely upon first principles or
agreement on the larger goals of sentencing to strike the right balance. The
contradictory strands within the Guidelines and the disagreement between the
Commission and the Court about the degree of individualization appropriate
under the Guidelines leave ample room for the circuit courts of appeals to go
their own way, as they have since Koon was decided. 12' The Supreme Court
did not go far enough when it held that the district courts should be reviewed
for abuse of discretion.
It is evident from the start of the analysis of the Guidelines that the Court
disagrees with Sentencing Commission orthodoxy. According to the Court,
Congress moved from a regime of judicial discretion to mandatory guidelines
to address the "perceptions" of disparate treatment of similarly situated offenders.' 22 Justice Kennedy ends that discussion by noting that the Guidelines are mandatory, "if the case is an ordinary one. " 123 He goes on to characterize the SRA as "[a]cknowledging the wisdom, even the necessity, of
sentencing procedures that take into account individual circumstances
"124

The Court looks to the Sentencing Guidelines Manual to understand the
structure of departures and chooses a section in which the Commission acknowledged that the question of how amenable sentencing is to complete
categorization remains unresolved. 25 The Court cites the discussion of the
Commission's reasons for completely prohibiting only a small group of factors but permitting consideration of other factors if in a very circumscribed
manner.' 26 Quoting from the Manual, Justice Kennedy notes:
"First, it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sen121
122

See Part IV infra for a discussion of the post-Koon cases.
See Koon, 518 U.S. at 92.

123 Id.
124

Id. "Wisdom" and "necessity" are strong words here, as Congress has the power to

pass mandatory guidelines without departure power.
121 See id. at 93-94. This is the struggle between individualized sentencing and Guidelines sentencing. If guidelines are to be applied, some differences among cases cannot be
accounted for with differing sentences. The issue is always which differences are relevant
and which differences are not. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 82, at 1339; Schulhofer, supra
note 83, at 864-65.
126 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 94. The Court notes that the Guidelines do provide some
guidance on what factors may be considered. See id. at 94-95.
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tencing decision. The Commission also recognizes that the initial set of
guidelines need not do so. The Commission is a permanent body, empowered by law to write and rewrite guidelines, with progressive
changes, over many years. By monitoring when courts depart from the
guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and court
decisions with references thereto, the Commission, over time, will be
able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures
should and should not be permitted.
Second, the Commission believes that despite the courts' legal
freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often.
This is because the guidelines, offense by offense, seek to take account
of those factors that the Commission's data indicate made a significant
" 7
difference in pre-guidelines sentencing practice." 2
The Commission's view that it is difficult to capture all the potentially
relevant conduct is surely an understatement. It is impossible to capture it
all. Again, the contested ground is over what is to be.declared irrelevant.
The notion that continued monitoring of ongoing decisions will permit refinement will only get the Commission.so far. If departures are really based
on the atypical, we must question the grand design of perfecting the Guidelines over time.
The justification for why departures should not occur "very often" suffers
a related flaw. It assumes that the Commission's historical approach captures the unusual. But by definition, departures are.based upon factors that
operate in an unusual or atypical way in a given case. The Commission cannot have it both ways. It pays lip service to individual sentencing, but as
many have commented, it chose sentencing in the aggregate. 2 8 The Supreme Court nods to the Commission's dream of a.sufficiently complex set
of rules to "encompass[ ] the vast range,"z2 9 but it chooses a model much
more consistent with the common law idea of case by case adjudication. In
so doing, it makes no mention of that gulf, even while quoting the Commission as if the two visions were consistent.
After reviewing the Commission's general orientation toward departures
and defining the typical and atypical case, the Court adopts Commissioner,
Judge, and Justice Breyer's departure road map for sentencing courts, listing
the inquiries that a sentencing court considering a departure should ask:
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines' 'heartland' and make of it a special, or unusual, case?

127

Id. at 93-94 (quoting GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b)).

See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 902 ("[G]uidelines regimes substitute punishment
based on aggregations of similar cases."); Stith & Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1281
(criticizing the Commission's effort to capture all possible factors as "micro-managing").
128

129 Koon, 518 U.S. at 93.
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Has the Commission forbidden departures based on those features?

3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on those
features?
4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those
features?

30

If a factor is forbidden, the district court is prohibited, as a matter of law,
from basing a departure upon it.'3' If a factor is encouraged, a court is
authorized to depart if the applicable Guideline does not already take it into
account. 32 If it is discouraged, the factor must (1)be present to an exceptional degree, or (2) make the case different from the ordinary case presenting that factor. 133 If the Guidelines do not mention a factor, the court must
consider the Guidelines as a whole, bearing in mind that departures on
134
grounds not mentioned will be "highly infrequent."
With that background, the Supreme Court holds that district court decisions to depart will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 135 The Court based
its holding on the traditional role of district and appellate courts in sentencing, which, the Court tells us, the SRA did not fundamentally alter. 136 The
Court makes two arguments in support of that questionable view of the SRA.
The first argument is that "Congress did not intend, by establishing limited
appellate review, to vest in appellate courts wide-ranging authority over district court sentencing decisions. Indeed, the text of § 3742 manifests an intent that district courts retain much of their traditional sentencing discretion." 137 Two aspects of this argument are unconvincing.
First, mandatory guidelines, subject to appellate review, completely
changed the kind of discretion exercised by district courts. Although the
new system retains some discretionary elements, the Court uses two different
senses of discretion to minimize a fundamental change. The old system offered an example of both standardless and unreviewable discretion. These
represented one of Dworkin's weak categories and perhaps an example of

131Id. at 95 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993))
(opinion by then-First Circuit Chief Judge Breyer).
3' See id. at 95-96.
132 See id. at 96.

133See id. (citing Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949).
13'GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.
135 See

Koon, 518 U.S. at 91.

1,pt. A (1995).

See id. at 98.
Id. at 97. Section 3742(e) provides, "The court of appeals shall give due regard to
the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due
deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 18 U.S.C. §
3742(e) (1994).
136
137
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strong discretion, 1 38 as well as both primary and secondary discretion in Ro39
senberg's terms. 1
The appellate review introduced by the SRA changed all that. Decisions
formerly standardless and unreviewable are now subject to detailed rules and
review. The suggestion that § 3742 "manifests an intent that district courts
maintain much of their traditional sentencing discretion, "14° stands the SRA
on its head. Contrary to the Court's assertion, the creation of substantive
appellate review (which Justice Kennedy tendentiously labels "limited")
dramatically changed the landscape. The Court quotes its own arguably
contentious observation that "except to the extent specifically directed by
statute, 'it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for
that of the sentencing court.'" 141 The statute at issue, the SRA, specifically
directs appellate courts to substitute their judgment for a number of sentenc42
ing issues formerly left entirely to the district court. 1
The Court's second argument rests upon the principles that appellate
courts should defer to factual determinations of trial courts, and more contentiously, though not argued here, that these departures decisions are factual, not legal questions. 43 Justice Kennedy makes the transition between
the argument about the "traditional" relationship between trial and appellate
courts in sentencing and the factual nature of departure decisions by observing that some trial court decisions are not owed deference. His example
posits a mathematical error in Guideline calculations, where the appellate
court is in as good a position to address the error as the district court would
be. He contrasts the case of mathematical error with most departure determinations, which "embod[y] the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court."'"
Identification of the "traditional" exercise of discretion begins by distinguishing fact from law, as a functional classification. 4 5 The classification of
an issue as fact, law, or mixed determines the appropriate standard of review. At one end of the spectrum are judicial decisions about particular
historical events. 146 When a district judge must determine what happened
138

See supra note 52.

139 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
140

Koon, 518 U.S. at 97.

141 Id. (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992) (quoting Solem v.

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983))).
142

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994) (providing authority for an appellate court to review,

and overturn if necessary, a district court's sentencing judgment).
143See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98.
144Id.
145See id.
146

See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1995) (collecting cases and dis-

cussing the "slippery" line between law and fact in the cases). In Townsend v. Sain, the
Court defined fact as "basic, primary or historical facts: facts 'in the sense of a recital of
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and the closely related question of whom to believe, the decisions will only
be overturned if it is clearly erroneous.1 47 That standard has been justified
largely in terms of institutional competence and efficiency. The trial judge is
in the best position to make a decision, as the trial judge has observed the
evidence first hand and is able to weigh everything in context. Hence, appellate judges should not spend time learning the record in sufficient detail to
interpose their own judgment as their judgment might not be generally applicable to other cases.
In contrast are general questions whose answers do not depend on any of
the particulars of the case at hand and, hence, are readily identifiable as
questions of law. Those questions are reviewed de novo because the trial
court is in no better position to make the decision than the appellate court.
Moreover, only the appellate court is able to compare the many lower court
cases and bring uniformity to a given area. 148
Relying on that analysis, the Court reasons that the standard' of review in
Koon flows from the fact sensitive, context-dependent nature of the sentencing decision. 149 But the normative question of whether or not sentencing decisions should be fact- and context-sensitive is at the heart of the dispute.
The Court's choice of the abuse of discretion standard is not determined by
the nature of the sentencing decision; rather, its choice of a model of sentencing determines the standard of review.
Although there are many examples of pure fact and pure law, the two
categories are not analytically distinct 150 and the Supreme Court has disa-

external events and the credibility of their narrators."' 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963)
(quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953)). Thompson discusses the mixed
question, which requires the application of law to fact, but not fact in the Townsend sense,
sometimes turning on evaluation of the "related circumstances" from the perspective of a
reasonable person. See 516 U.S. at 113. As reasonable person assessments "fall within
the province of the drier of fact," the issue is left largely to the trial court. Id. at 113
n.13.
I'l That standard has been defined as requiring "the appellate court to uphold any district court determination that falls within a broad range of permissible conclusions."
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990).
148 Whether under an abuse of discretion or de novo standard, errors of law are never
given deference. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990).
149See Koon, 518 U.S. at 99-100.
15oThe relationship between facts and law has received attention from the legal realists,
see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 125 (1963) ("The judge, in arriving at
his hunch, does not nicely separate his belief at the 'facts' from his conclusion as to the

'law'; his general hunch is more integral and composite, and affects his report-both to
himself and to the public-concerning the facts."), the legal process school, see HENRY M.
HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 349-62

(1994) (defending the view

that the distinction is not merely functional, but relying upon institutional and process

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

19991

vowed any comprehensive test for cases not governed by statute or long historical practice.' 51 The Court has most often reasoned about institutional
competence to decide a particular question'52 and uses susceptibility to useful
generalization as a test for distinguishing generalizable law from ungeneralizable fact.153 Although the Court has recognized that the use of fact or
law labels turns on decisions about who should decide and whether general
rules should control the area, it also continues to use the labels to justify its
decision. Labeling departure decisions as factual is Koon's outcome, not its
rationale.
The question of whether sentencing decisions involve "the consideration of
unique factors that are 'little susceptible ...

of useful generalization' and as

a consequence, de novo review is 'unlikely to establish clear guidelines for
lower courts" 154 turns on whether the departure factor is judged extraordinary against the unique context of all the other facts of the particular case, or
only as compared to that same factor in other cases. Although the Court
chose the first view, the government's view, that the sentencing court must
compare the particular factor at issue to the "heartland" of cases to determine
if the factor is exceptional, presents the alternative, rule-determined model of
55
sentencing. 1
For example, victim misconduct is an allowable departure factor in certain
cases. 56 The government's concept of measuring the factor against its typical version in the "heartland" suggests that appellate courts could, as a general matter, rule that certain kinds of misconduct like cursing, would never
be enough to warrant a departure. Meanwhile, other misconduct like threats
of physical harm, coupled with some physical aggression but, not enough to
amount to a self-defense claim, could justify a departure. The district court's
role would be to determine if the threats and aggression in a particular case
were sufficient.
Under Koon, the inquiry is whether the factor is in the heartland, considering all the facts of the particular case, and then comparing it to the heart-

based justifications for the distinction), and critical theory, see
FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 262-63 (1988).

BERNARD JACKSON, LAW,

151See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558-59 (1988).
152 See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
13 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 99 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60
(1988); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985); and citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 403 (1990)).
'14 Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at
404).
155 See id. "The relevant question, however, is not, as the Government says, 'whether a

particular factor is within the 'heartland' as a general proposition,' but whether the particular factor is within the heartland given all the facts of the case." Id. (quoting Brief for
United States at 28).
156

See

GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5K2. 10.
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land. 157 Under this approach, cursing might be sufficient misconduct to warrant departure in one case, perhaps involving a mild mannered church going
defendant roused to a single punch by foul language. On the other hand,
actual victim violence might not justify a departure in a case where a slap by
a much smaller victim led to a pummeling by an already angry aggressor.
The choice to treat this as a case-specific, or factual matter, flows from
the Court's decision to maintain as much individualized sentencing as possible within the Guidelines scheme. Although the opinion suggests "it does
not advance the analysis much to determine that a victim's misconduct might
justify a departure in some aggravated assault cases," 158 it would advance the
analysis if the Court held that certain misconduct would never justify a departure.
The Court also argues that the factual nature of the inquiry gives the district court relatively greater institutional competence to determine whether a
factor is exceptional in a particular case:
District courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in
making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many
more Guidelines cases than appellate courts do. In 1994, for example,
59
93.9% of Guidelines cases were not appealed.'
Beyond the issue of the nature of the decision, there is also a problem with
appealing to institutional competence. The question is not whether district
judges, as a group, see more cases but rather whether a given court is in a
better position to evaluate hard cases. The 4262 cases that raised at least one
sentencing issue on appeal in fiscal 1996160 could certainly go a long way
toward developing a comprehensive body of case law. Given the wide range
of the criminal cases, each district court does not see many of each type of
case. 161 This gives them no institutional advantage over circuit judges, who
hear a wider selection of cases and have the benefit of the views of the district judge and the other members of their panels.
The Court's adoption of the abuse of discretion standard is not supported
by the history of judicial exercise of another kind of discretion, nor the analytically factual nature of the sentencing decision. Rather, the Court chose
this standard based on its judgment that departures should be determined case

157

See Koon, 518 U.S. at 99-100.

158 Id. at 100.

1.9 Id. at 98-99 (citing Letter from Pamela G. Montgomery, Deputy General Counsel,
United States Sentencing Commission (Mar. 29, 1996)).
160 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 ANN. REP. 39-41 (providing a breakdown of
appeals presenting only sentence issues, sentence and conviction issues and only conviction
issues).
161 Narcotics cases may be the exception. Some district courts routinely see hundreds
of these cases every year. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 99, at 159 (noting that there
were 25,084 federal drug prosecutions in 1990).
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by case, rather than by applying general principles. 162 This choice reflects
the Court's adherence to the model of old law discretion and largely unfettered judicial power to impose sentence. It rejects the Commission's dream
of seamless, comprehensive rules, which would further concentrate sentencing power in the Commission.
The Court then applied the standard to the case at hand. At the trial, two
police officers, Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell, were convicted of violating Rodney King's civil rights under color of law.163 At sentencing, the
guideline imprisonment range for both officers was seventy to eighty-seven
months.'64 The district court departed downward a total of eight levels, five
levels based on its finding that King's misconduct provoked the attack, and
three levels based on a combination of four factors particular to these defendants and this case. 165 The sentencing court departed to an imprisonment
range of thirty to thirty-seven months and sentenced both defendants to thirty
months imprisonment. 166 Both defendants appealed their convictions and the
government appealed the sentences. 167 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit applied the de novo standard of review and rejected all
68
the departure grounds upon which the district court relied. 1
Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court held that the
district court's five level departure pursuant to guideline § 5K2.10169 was not
an abuse of discretion.1 70 The Supreme Court closely analyzed the guideline
under which the defendants were sentenced and found that because it covers
both unprovoked attacks by officials, as well at those that begin as legitimate
uses of force but later become excessive, the district court had discretion to
determine that this situation involved provocation that was outside the heartland of the guideline. 171

162

See Koon, 518 U.S. at 99-100. As the Court stakes out this area of case specific

review, and holds that deference to the trial court is appropriate because generalizations

are not useful in fact intensive cases, it also notes that errors of law are always an abuse of
discretion. See id. Therefore, appellate courts will always decide the legal question of
whether a given factor is permissible as a matter of law. That a departure decision, in an
occasional case, may call for a legal determination does not mean that parts of the review
must be labeled de novo while other parts are labeled an abuse of discretion. See id. at
100.
163 See id. at 88. Two others, Timothy Wind and Ted Briseno, were acquitted. See id.
161 See id. at 89 (applying guideline sections to reach sentence).
165

See id.

166

See id. at 90.

167

See id.
See id. at 99-100.

168

169 GUIDELINES MANUAL

§5 K.210 (allowing downward departure when victim contrib-

utes to provoking the substantive offense).
170 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 105.
171

See id. at 102-05.
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The Court then examined the three level departure based on four different
factors: collateral employment consequences, low likelihood of recidivism,
72
susceptibility to abuse in prison and the burden of successive prosecutions.
The Court began by rejecting the government's argument that all the factors
should be ruled improper in all cases.1 73 The Court reaffirmed the rule that
if a factor is not explicitly prohibited by the Guidelines, a court may not
categorically reject it as74 a matter of law, but rather must consider the factor
in the individual case. 1
The Court continued, ruling that the sentencing court abused its discretion
in departing downward based on the collateral employment consequences of
the convictions and the low likelihood of recidivism. 175 The adverse employment consequences to Officers Koon and Powell did not take this case
out of the heartland of cases involving violation of rights under color of law
because the defendant in such cases is typically a public official who will suffer career related consequences. 176 The Court reasoned that the Commission
already considered low likelihood of recidivism in setting the criminal history
78
category. 177 Therefore, that factor can never be a basis for departure.'
The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion, however, in departing
downward based on the susceptibility to abuse in prison and the burden of
dual or successive prosecution in the state and federal courts.179 The Court
found that the district court's determination that exceptional media attention
deto this case put these defendants at particular risk was "just the sort of
180 It
termination that must be accorded deference by the appellate courts.
also found that the district court correctly considered the lengthy state trial
and the burdens of successive prosecutions in this case. 181
Others have noted that Koon 's rhetoric of deference is paired with a very
close analysis of the district court's reasoning and only limited approval of
the sentence imposed by the district court. 8 2 But the problems with the del"2 See id.at 106-12.
173See
174See

id.
at 106.
id.at 108-09.
171 See id.
at 109-12.
176 See id.at 110.
177See id. at I11.
178 See id.
179See id.
at 111-12.
Is0 id.at 112.
181 See id.
182

See United States v. Otis, 107 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1997) (Evans, J.,concurring)

(Koon's "rhetorical embrace of deference, doesn't jibe well with its non-deferential behavior-although the major basis for the district court's downward departure was approved, several lesser reasons for the departure were questioned. Thus Koon will continue, not soothe the friction that exists today between district and appellate courts on
departure jurisprudence."); see also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1278 (noting
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cision go deeper. Koon's failure to distinguish between the tradition of complete secondary (non-reviewable) discretion and the post-SRA regime of reviewable primary (decision-making) discretion, has furthered doctrinal incoherence and decisional disarray in the lower courts. Koon does not
recognize that the circuit courts are reviewing the exercise of a new kind of
discretion. The decision fosters continued debate about the way things were
done under the old law, when it should refocus on the question of how discretion should be exercised under the new law.
The abuse of discretion standard of review is widely acknowledged to encompass a broad spectrum of appellate deference to lower court decisions,
"from the virtually irresistible to the virtually meaningless." 183 As Childress
& Davis explain, "[t]he level of deference given to discretionary decisions
by the trial court varies with the issue, the stage of legal development, and
the court."8 4 When there is a history of the exercise-of discretion, case law
gives courts guidance on the actual level of deference to be used when applying the abuse of discretion standard to a particular issue. In reviewing the
district court's decision to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court's reliance on a "uniform and constant ...

federal judicial tra-

dition" 185 of discretion holds out false hope for consistent application of the
abuse of discretion standard. The old law system of standardless and unreviewed discretion offers no guidance for developing decision and reviewlimiting discretion. The SRA's adoption of appellate review dammed a free
flowing stream. The Supreme Court's adoption of the abuse of discretion
standard in Koon offers little control over how much water will be permitted
to flow through the spillway.

Koon's expansive rhetoric of discretion but analyzing that rhetoric as in tension with the
holding and reasoning of the opinion); Reitz, supra note 62, at 1466 (characterizing Koon
as an effort to reverse the rigidity of the appellate decisions).
"83 Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 660. See generally CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note
39, § 4.21 (defining and discussing a contextual definition of the abuse of discretion standard); id. § 7.06 (discussing the malleability of the standard); Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982) (arguing that abuse of discretion is not a
unitary standard, but denotes a level of review appropriate to the nature of the trial court
decision).
184 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 39, § 7.06. In this area, it varies with the reviewing court. See infra notes 190-92.
"85Koon, 518 U.S. at 113.
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186
IV. KoONIN THE CIRCUIT COURTS

Koon has changed the rhetoric of departure jurisprudence in the courts of
appeals, but it has done little to change outcomes.18 7 Its individualizing language has been embraced by the Second Circuit, which most actively encouraged individualization before Koon, while courts that emphasized uniform sentencing before Koon, such as the Fourth Circuit, continue to cite the
SRA's goal of reducing disparity. 188 An analysis of all the downward departure cases decided by the courts of appeals from the time Koon was decided through January 23, 1998,189 shows that those courts fall into three
groups. Seven courts have applied the elastic abuse of discretion standard as
186 This Article discusses the developing doctrine of individualization of sentencing
through review of appellate court opinions. Appellate doctrine has an impact on sentencing patterns in the district courts, see Gelacek et al., supra note 111, at 358-59 (finding
that pre-Koon circuit court cases were, to some extent, reflected in district court practices), but appellate analysis only provides limited insight into the sentences actually imposed in the district courts. Government appeal of downward departures is discretionary
and the government does not have the same incentive to appeal every case as does the convicted defendant. See id. at 302-04 (describing the article's focus on district court results
before Koon and discussing the limits of generalizing about departure patterns on the basis
of appellate case analysis). There were 4201 non-substantial assistance downward departures in the 1996 reporting year, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 ANN. REP. tbl.26,
but only about 100 appellate decisions concerning non-substantial assistance downward
departures in that period. The vast majority are not appealed and the reality of that low
rate of appeal might be an important source of practical judicial discretion. For a discussion of the need for empirical work in this area, see Reitz, supra note 62, at 1489-92.
187 Sentencing habits persist despite changes in the law. For example, district courts
have tended to impose guidelines sentences consistent with their pre-guidelines sentencing
practices. See Gelacek et al., supra note 111, at 361-62 (finding that those districts that
were relatively lenient before the Guidelines remain relatively lenient).
18 See Reitz, supra note 62, at 1468 n.97 (collecting pre-Koon cases reversing downward departures). Reitz offers a fascinating, pre-Koon systemic explanation for what he
calls the "high enforcement/low judicial creativity approach" of the federal appellate
courts. See id. at 1466. Although his citations suggest less willingness to affirm departures than a complete catalog would show, he does capture an important and significant
thread. The approach he notes is in evidence in the majority of circuits, as they have enforced the Commission's goal of uniformity and placed little emphasis on common law
development. He notes that "it is possible Koon will effect changes ... but it is too soon
to tell." Id. at 1466 n.98. This Article demonstrates that Koon is too weak to change
those patterns. Stith & Cabranes' analysis also notes the differences among the circuits
discussed in this article, see Stith & Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1278, but they focus on
the Commission's power to constrain discretion by exercising its authority to denominate a
given factor as a forbidden basis for departure.
189 This Article analyzes all the circuit court cases, decided before January 23, 1998,
that apply Koon in reviewing district court decisions granting a defendant's motion for a
downward departure. See supra note 111 for a discussion of why upward departures cases
are not discussed.
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a general rule to reverse every downward departure,' 9° while one court has
affirmed every downward departure it has reviewed. 1 9' In the middle are
four courts that use the language of individualized, discretionary sentencing
when they affirm, and write off the importance of uniform sentencing when
they reverse district court decisions to depart downward from the Guidelines.192 The deference actually shown to district courts under the abuse of
discretion standard depends on the reviewing court and which of the two
93
competing visions it chooses for the particular case. 1
A. Discretion as Individualized Sentencing: The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has set the standard for individualized sentencing under the Guidelines in affirming all four downward departure cases it has re190 The First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits had not yet affirmed a downward departure. However, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have affirmed
some grounds for departure while reversing others in particular cases. The First, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits have been most aggressive in defending uniform sentencing, with the
Eighth Circuit close behind. Those courts have reversed each time they have reviewed the
core discretionary determination of whether the departure ground is exceptional, given all
the facts of the case. The D.C. Circuit had only considered, and reversed, one downward
departure case, although that case also shows a willingness to engage in independent, i.e.,
non-deferential, review. The Third Circuit has only reversed on legal grounds, finding the
departure factors impermissible. The fact that half the circuits have not affirmed a down%yarddeparture since the deferential Koon standard was announced strongly supports Reitz's characterization that the federal appellate courts have placed a heavy emphasis on
guidelines enforcement and a low value on judicial creativity. See Reitz, supra note 62, at
1465; see also Gelacek et al., supra note 111, at 336-51 (analyzing pre-Koon circuit court
cases). For a discussion of the cases, see infra notes 272-365 and accompanying text.
191 The Second Circuit has affirmed all the downward departures it has reviewed since
Koon. See infra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.
192 The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have affirmed some downward departures and reversed others. See infra notes 216-71 and accompanying text.
193 One might argue that the pattern of circuit court decisions reflects the wisdom of
federal prosecutors' exercise of their discretion to appeal downward departures. Most
downward departures are not appealed. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98-99
(1996) (noting that in 1994, 93.9% of Guidelines cases were not appealed) (citing Letter
from Pamela G. Montgomery, Deputy General Counsel, United States Sentencing Commission (Mar. 29, 1996)). If prosecutors are using their discretion wisely, and only appealing the cases where judges egregiously granted an improper downward departure, then
the government should win most of these appeals. Therefore, it may not be surprising that
half the circuit courts have yet to affirm a downward departure. Although there is certainly a grain of truth in that view, as the government does forego appeals in many easy
downward departure cases in which the defendant rightfully deserves a lower sentence, the
analysis which follows shows that prosecutorial wisdom is only a small part of the explanation. The cases in the Fourth Circuit are not obviously weaker than those in the Second
Circuit and the differing styles of analysis are not explained by the prosecutors' choices of
cases to appeal.
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viewed since Koon.194 That court has shown great deference to the district
judge's finding that a given factor is exceptional and falls outside the heartland. In United States v. Rioux, 195 the Second Circuit affirmed a departure
based on the defendant's poor health and good acts.196 After a lengthy discussion of several legal issues which did not merit reversal of the underlying
conviction, the court affirmed the downward departure in three paragraphs. 97 The Court of Appeals first noted the Koon abuse of discretion
standard. 198 It then cited prior cases holding that physical impairment and
good works are not ordinarily relevant, but may justify a departure in extraordinary cases, either singly or in combination. 99 The analysis of the departure in this case consisted solely of the Court of Appeals repeating the
facts upon which the district court relied and holding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the factors, in combination,
warranted a downward departure. 200 Rioux illustrates the most deferential
application of Koon. After finding the factors relied upon by the district
court permissible, the reviewing court simply recites the facts relied upon by
the district court and offers no independent analysis.
The Second Circuit expounded on the deference due district courts in
United States v. Galante.20 1 In that case, the court affirmed the district
court's downward departure on the basis of extraordinary family circum-

'9

See United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Na-

jjar, No. 96-1478, 1997 WL 87231(2d Cir. Mar. 3, 1997); United States v. Caba, No. 961069(L), 1996 WL 685764 (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 1996); United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648
(2d Cir. 1996).
1' 97 F.3d 648 (2d Cir. 1996). The defendant, who was the elected sheriff of Hartford
County, Connecticut, was convicted by a jury of extorting money from the Deputy and
Special Deputy Sheriffs he appointed and reappointed annually. See id. at 653. Rioux
appealed his conviction and the government cross-appealed the district court's downward
departure from an offense level of 20, which would have required a term of imprisonment
of at least 33 months, to an offense level of 10, which permitted the nonincarceratory sentence imposed (three years probation; six months home confinement and 500 hours of

community service). See id. 653-54.
196 See id. at 654. In this case, the health problems included a 20-year-old kidney
transplant which required medication and monitoring, and a double hip replacement due to
bone problems caused by the medication. The good acts cited included his hiring of an
impoverished Hispanic woman, a personal loan to an immigrant who purchased a home
from the defendant, charitable contributions, and leadership in fund-raising efforts. See
id.
1' See id. at 662-63.

See id.
"I See id. at 663.
200 See id.
198

201 111

F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1997).
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stances. 20 2 Judge Cardamone, citing Koon, observed that the SRA "did not
alter the deference an appellate court owes to the exercise of the sentencing
court's discretion .... We are generally obliged to defer to a sentence imposed in district court, in light of that court's special competence regarding
the exceptional circumstances present in a sentencing case."203 Highlighting
the theme of individualized sentencing, he noted that "a trial judge's discretion when granting a downward departure is to be exercised prudently in
light of the Guideline's [sic] aim of reducing sentencing disparity-while at
the same time considering the history and characteristics of an individual defendant ... "204 Prudent discretion is generously defined as anything not
"so far removed from those [circumstances] found exceptional in existing
case law [so] that the sentencing court may be said to be acting outside permissible limits; then, and only then, should we rule [that the sentencing
court] has misused its discretion."205
The opinion concludes by rejecting the government's contention that this
case would open the floodgates, observing that the district court found the
case exceptional and the principle remains that family circumstances are not
ordinarily relevant. 2°6 Judge Cardamone observes, "we might-had we been
the sentencing court-have decided this case differently .... But . . . we
may not simply substitute our judgment for his .... "207
Judge Kearse, in dissent, argued that the case "do[es] not reveal family
circumstances that are outside the heartland," because disruption and disintegration of family life is a "normal consequence[ ] of the imposition of a
prison sentence. 20 8 She argued that "approval of the present departure either guarantees disparities in sentencing or eliminates the family-impact
'heartland' altogether." 20 9 The disagreement between the majority and dissent in Galante reprises the tension between reviving the old model of individualized sentencing through deferential application of abuse of discretion

See id. at 1032-33. The district court departed from the applicable sentencing range
of 46-57 months to a sentence of eight days time served, five years supervised release with
special conditions including two years home detention, and 225 hours of community service. See id. at 1031. Galante was a first time offender involved in a kilogram heroin
transaction who had been married for 10 years, shared child care responsibilities for two
children, ages eight and nine, with his wife and frequently visited his elderly, hospitalized
father. See id. at 1032. The district court relied, in part, upon the defendant's role as his
family's chief money maker and the consequences of his imprisonment on the family. See
id.
203 Id. at 1035-36.
204 Id. at 1036.
205 Id. The opinion goes on to survey circuit and district court decisions. Id. at n.2
206 See id. at 1037.
202

207

Id.

208

Id. at 1037-38.
Id. at 1039.

209
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review and realizing the Guidelines goal of uniformity through more active
appellate review.
In United States v. Caba,210 the Second Circuit displayed its commitment
to individualized sentencing in cases presenting the question of whether, as a
legal matter, certain offense conduct fell outside the heartland of the relevant
guideline. In Caba, the government prosecuted the defendant's violation of
food stamp redemption regulations under both food stamp and money laundering statutes. 2 " The district court departed from the "relatively severe"
money laundering guideline and imposed a thirty-month sentence consistent
with prosecution under the relevant food stamp fraud guideline. 21 2 The
Court of Appeals' affirmance of the district court's finding that the heartland
of the money laundering guideline could easily be interpreted to cover only
the proceeds of the illegal drug trade and "serious money laundering
fraud." 21 3 In this case, the money had nothing to do with drug proceeds,
"the crime did not divert government monies from their intended purpose,
but instead violated regulations designed to deter such diversion," and the
defendant was "hardly trying to hide his activities."214 Caba illustrates the
individualized approach to the legal question of the identification of permissible departure factors. In concluding, the Second Circuit buttressed its
that Caba's thirty-month sentence was
analysis with the observation
"reasonable given his crime." 21 5
B. Discretionas the Choice Between Individualizationand Uniformity in
Sentencing: The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have affirmed some departures and reversed others in cases that choose either the individualizing or
disparity reducing models, depending on the outcome of the case. The Tenth
Circuit cited the Supreme Court's use of the history of discretion in affirming

210 No. 96-1069(L), 1996 WL 685764 (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 1996).
211

See id. at *1.

22 Id. at *3. The money laundering guidelines would have resulted in a sentencing

range of 87-108 months as Caba laundered in excess of $10 million. See id. at *1; see
also GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1 .1.
213 Caba, 1996 WL 685764, at *3.
214 Id. The same question, the application of money laundering guidelines to food
stamp fraud, resulted in the same answer in United States v. Najjar, No. 96-1478, 1997
WL 87231 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 1997), with the additional analysis that the guideline separates
drug proceeds and non-drug proceeds. Thus, the fact that the case did not involve drug
proceeds was not alone sufficient for a departure, but the combination of factors in that
case was an adequate basis.
215 Caba, 1996 WL 685764, at *4.
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the downward departure in United States v. Goodluck, 216 an arson case presenting atypical offense conduct. The district court found that the defendants, while intoxicated, lit small fires in a warehouse to illuminate and
warm the interior, but determined that the conduct at the heartland of the
guideline is insurance fraud, revenge, riot and similar circumstances. 217 The
Tenth Circuit deferred to the district court's individualization of the sentence,
concluding its two page order and judgment with this observation:
In Koon, the Supreme Court stressed that "[i]t has been uniform and
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to. consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique
study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes mag2 18
nify, the crime and the punishment to ensue."
In another short order and judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a downward departure in United States v. Ramirez, 219 a narcotics distribution case.
The district court based the departure on a combination of factors, including
the defendant's diabetes, extreme obesity, and severe depression, her daily
care of her mother, her assistance to her elderly father, and her sole responsibility for the care of her fourteen-year-old son. 220 The court of appeals
noted that all of the factors are permissible grounds as either discouraged or
unmentioned factors. 221 Without any analysis, the circuit court recited the
district court's finding that the combination of factors put the case outside the
222
guideline and held that it was not an abuse of discretion to depart.
The Tenth Circuit took a less deferential approach in two other cases,
United States v. Maden223 and United States v. Contreras.224 The court re-

No. 95-2099, 1996 WL 700036 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 1996). The district court departed from an unspecified range to a sentence of six months imprisonment, three years
supervised release, nine months community service, and restitution. See id. at *1.
217 See id.
218 Id. (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
219 No. 95-2198, 1996 WL 480210 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1996). The district court departed downward from the applicable guidelines sentencing range of 30-37 months to 1218 months, 12 months imposed, with a three-year supervised release period and a special
assessment of $100. See id. at *1.
220 See id.
221 See id. at *2.
222 See id.
223 114 F.3d 155 (10th Cir. 1997). Maden was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. The district court sentenced him to 240
months imprisonment, departing downward from the applicable guideline range of 360
months to life. See id. at 156.
224 108 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1997). Contreras was convicted of drug conspiracy and
money laundering crimes; the district court sentenced the defendant to 120 months imprisonment, departing downward from the applicable guideline range of 235-293 months. See
id. at 1259.
216
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versed both of these downward departures based on disparity between codefendants and held that whether or not disparity can ever be grounds for
departure, it is not grounds where the disparate sentences are because one
defendant pleads guilty instead of going to trial or because defendants have
different criminal histories. 225 In these two instances, the district court gave
reasons for its decision, but the reviewing court accorded those reasons less
deference, looking closely at the sentencing courts' judgment of the individual case.
The Fifth Circuit has explicitly invoked both sentencing models when reviewing downward departures, citing the goal of decreasing disparity when
reversing while highlighting Koon's emphasis on deference when affirming.
Given the need to balance these competing goals and the compromises at the
heart of the Guidelines, the Fifth Circuit reflects the reality of federal sentencing but does little to advance doctrinal clarity.
In United States v. Winters,226 the Fifth Circuit reversed the downward
departures granted to two prison lieutenants who participated in an assault on
a prison escapee. 227 After laying out Koon's analytical framework, the re225 See United States v. Maden, 114 F.3d 155, 159 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Gallegos,
129 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1997) (reversing downward departure granted to one of Maden's
codefendants, when one basis for departure was disparity between Gallegos' sentence and
that of a third codefendant who had received a plea bargain; the circuit court also rejected
the four other departure grounds relied upon by the district court); United States v. Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 953 (10th Cir. 1997) (reversing district court's vacating of defendant's sentence and guilty plea, holding that "where the record is insufficient to show codefendants or co-conspirators were similarly situated offenders engaged in similar conduct,
a disparity between their sentences is not grounds for a downward departure from the
minimum guideline range").
226 105 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1997).
227 Defendant Terry Winters was convicted of deprivation of rights under color of law,
see 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994), use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime, see 18
U.S.C. § 924(d), and obstruction of justice, see 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See Winters, 105 F.3d
at 203. The district court imposed a sentence of concurrent 12-month terms of imprisonment for the deprivation of rights under color of law and obstruction of justice counts, a
consecutive 60-month term of imprisonment for use of a firearm, concurrent three-year
terms of supervised release, a special assessment of $150, and a fine of $2,000. See id.
The applicable guideline range dictated a sentence of 108-135 months of imprisonment for
the deprivation of rights under color of law and obstruction of justice violations, to which
the mandatory consecutive 60 months imprisonment for the firearms violation would have
been added. See id. at 206. The district court justified its downward departure because
Winters' crime was a single act of aberrant behavior. See id.
Defendant David Johns was convicted of influencing and impeding the due administration of justice, see 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See Winters, 105 F.3d at 203. The district court
departed downward from the applicable guideline range of 37-46 months of imprisonment
to a sentence of three years of probation, conditioned upon Johns' serving six months of
in-home detention and participating in a mental health treatment program. See id. In
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viewing court concluded that Winters' course of criminal behavior could not
be "converted into a single aberrant act by viewing it in the context of...
his being under the influence of the [prison's] institutional culture or accepted code of conduct." 228 The court determined that the Commission specifically addressed and. incorporated within the Guidelines punishment for
crimes that involve the abuse of a public position (such as that of a prison
lieutenant), considering such circumstances to be aggravating rather than
mitigating. 229 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded, "[t]o decide here that either
encouraging or condoning such an activity by the branch itself somehow establishes a framework that could convert such behavior into a single instance
of aberrant behavior would be entirely inconsistent with the structure and
theory of the Guidelines."230 The court then applied the same reasoning to
Winters' steady employment record and support of his family. 231 The circuit
court chided the district court's individualization of the sentence, implying
that a sentencing court's dissatisfaction with the Guidelines' dictates may indicate that it lacks the proper detachment or is motivated by bias when sentencing. Quoting from Koon, the court stated:
"The goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is, of course, to reduce unjustified disparities and so reach towards the evenhandedness and neutrality
that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice. In
this respect, the Guidelines provide uniformity, predictability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system."232
granting the departure, the district court cited Johns' adverse physical and mental conditions, as well as his history of decorated military service and distinguished career at the
Mississippi Department of Corrections. See id.
228 Winters, 105 F.3d at 207. The court determined that Winters's behavior constituted
a course of criminal conduct rather than a single act, by categorizing the assault with the
subsequent attempts to coerce witness testimony as multiple infractions that were "not a
proper ground for a downward departure." Id.
229 See id. (citing GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3).
230

Id.

See id. at 207-08. ("The Commission considered and expressly discouraged sentencing courts from departing from the Guidelines on the basis of either employment records on family ties."). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the downward departure
granted to Johns, ruling that the district court did not express why his medical and physical
condition should be treated as exceptional, nor why his military career was so extraordinary as to justify a downward departure. See id. at 208-09. As was the case with Winters, the circuit court held that the district court's reliance on Johns' employment record,
without articulating why those circumstances were exceptional, was not an appropriate departure basis. See id. at 209. Finally, the court found that the district court's statement
that the punishment in Johns' case did not fit the crime, without additional articulation,
was not sufficient to justify a sentence outside the applicable range. See id. Even preKoon, the Fifth Circuit "has consistently held that the district court's disagreement with
the mandates of the Guidelines is not justification for departing from the Guidelines." Id.
232 Id. (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
231

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:493

Prior to its decision in Winters, the Fifth Circuit showed more sympathy
for individualized sentencing and a great deal more deference to the district
court's sentencing decision. In United States v. Walters, 233 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the downward departure granted to an insurance agent convicted of
mail fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy. 234 The court observed that
the district court unmistakably determined that Walters deserved mitigation
"[s]ince Mr. Walters himself did not receive any of the misappropriated
funds [and] the guideline calculation therefore overstates the seriousness of
his own involvement." 235 The court deemed Walters' lack of personal benefit from his crime to be an unmentioned factor in the money laundering
guideline and believed that this failure was a mitigating factor in determining
sentence. 2 36 The Fifth Circuit highlighted that its deference to the district
courts was "all the more buttressed" by Koon which "emphasized in the
strongest terms that the appellate court rarely should review de novo a decision to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, but instead should ask
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion." 237 The court affirmed
the district court's downward departure, concluding that there was no abuse
238
of discretion.
The Ninth Circuit has reviewed five downward departure cases, affirming
one, 239 reversing two, 240 and remanding two for either additional factual
findings 241 or a fuller explanation of the departure basis. 242 In United States

233

87 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1996).

See id. at 665. The district court relied on comment 10 of § 2Fl.1 of the Guidelines, which provides that when the amount of calculation used to assess the offense level
overstates the seriousness of the offense, a downward departure may be warranted. See
id. at 671 n.9. The government, in appealing the sentence, contended that comment 10
was an invalid ground for departure; the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to address that
contention because it found that the district court would have imposed the same sentence
irrespective of the legal error asserted by the government. See id.
235 Id. at 671. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged another applicable guideline as a basis
for the downward departure that the district court could have relied upon in making its
sentencing decision. The court looked to the general departure provision, § 5K2.0, which
allows a district court to depart from the applicable sentencing range if there exists a mitigating circumstance of a kind or degree not adequately considered by the Guidelines. See
id. (citing GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0).
236 See id. at 671-72.
234

Id. at 672 n.10 (citing Koon, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)).
See id. at 672.
239 See United States v. Lopez, 106 F.3d 309, 311 (9th Cir. 1997).
24 See United States v. Colace, 126 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Harris, Nos. 95-10506, 95-10551, 1997 WL 85569 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1997).
241 See United States v. Cubillos, 91 F.3d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1996).
242 See United States v. Green, 105 F.3d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997).
237

238
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v. Lopez, 243 the district court had dismissed an indictment for governmental
misconduct after the prosecutor engaged in plea negotiations with the defendant without his attorney. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the
indictment in 1993.244 When the defendant was subsequently convicted after
remand and trial in 1995, the district court departed downward to restore the
defendant to the position he would have been in had the government not engaged in the original misconduct. 245 The circuit court, in 1997, affirmed the
departure because it found "[t]he prejudice Lopez encountered as a direct
result of the government's conduct was, in our view, significant enough to
take this case out of the heartland of the Guidelines." 246
In United States v. Harris,247 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
ten level downward departure following a conviction for conspiracy to commit a bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and use of a firearm in relation to
a 'violent crime.248 The district court departed downward because it found
the defendant's criminal conduct to be a spontaneous, aberrant first offense. 249 The court also justified the departure as it achieved proportionality
between both defendants' sentences. 250 In finding an abuse of discretion, the
circuit court reasoned that the criminal history category already considers
first offender status and therefore cannot be a basis for departure. 51 - The
court also found that a conspiracy conviction is contrary to a finding of
spontaneity, although it did not analyze the facts underlying the sentencing
court's decision in this case. 252 Although the circuit court noted that district
judges have latitude in departing, it declared that district judges may not consider prohibited factors including disparities in sentences received by codefendants. 253 In his one sentence dissent, Chief Judge Hug declared that he
would have affirmed the departure under the abuse of discretion standard of
review mandated by Koon.254

243

106 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1997). The district court departed from a (probable) range

of 188-235 months down to a sentence of 135 months. See id. at 310.
244
245

See id.
See id.

Id. at 311 (citing United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464-67 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Fletcher & Nelson, JJ., concurring) (detailing the prejudice to Lopez).
247 Nos. 95-10506, 95-10551, 1997 WL 85569 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1997).
246

See id. at *1.
See id. at *2.
250 See id at *1.
251 See id.
252 See id.
253 See id.
248

249

See id. at *3 (Hug, C.J., concurring in affirming the conviction but dissenting from
vacating the sentence).
254
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The Eleventh Circuit has reviewed four downward departures 255 and affirmed only one. The court, in United States v. Bernal, affirmed the sentence given to the defendants, who were convicted of the little prosecuted
federal crime of unlicensed exportation of endangered primates. 256 Because
the defendants had exported the apes for breeding and exhibition, rather than
to harm them, the district court determined that the defendants did not "cause
or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the [licensing]
law." 257 The circuit court ruled that because the lesser harm is an encouraged departure factor, 258 the district court "did not abuse its discretion in
making this decision [to depart downward].'"259
Of the three cases in which the Eleventh Circuit reversed downward departures, two, were reversed after analyses of the legality of the factors,
rather than their application to the facts of the particular case. 26° In United
States v. Hoffer,26 1 the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court departure
based upon the defendant's voluntary disgorgement of $50,000 of profit from
the crime and loss of his medical license. 262 The reviewing court offered a
detailed analysis of the role of forfeitures in the Guidelines and, by relying
on pre-Koon cases, concluded that civil forfeiture can never be a basis for
departure. 263 In its analysis of the loss of the medical license as a factor warranting downward departure, the court also relied upon categorical legal
analysis, rather than individualized consideration. 264 Hoffer's sentence was
enhanced for abuse of a position of trust, but the reviewing court found,
without any textual support in the Guidelines, that the Commission must
have considered collateral employment consequences in abuse of position of
See United States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196 (11 th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bush,
126 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Phillips, 120 F.3d 227(11th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Bernal, 90 F.3d 465 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
255

256 See Bernal, 90 F.3d at 467-68. The defendants were convicted of various violations
of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973. See id.

at 466. The district court departed from the applicable guideline ranges of 24-30 months
for defendant Bernal and 15-21 months for defendant Berges down to a sentence of seventy
days time served and supervised release for each defendant. See id. at 466-67 & n.3.

Id. at 467 (quoting, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2. 11).
Id. at 467-68.
259 See id.
260 United States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting factor
categorically); United States v. Bush, 126 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 1997) (factor not
supported by record); United States v. Phillips, 120 F.3d 227, 232 (11th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting factor categorically).
261 129 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 1997).
262 See id. at 1204-06. The defendant was a doctor convicted of narcotics distribution.
The district departed from an imprisonment range of 108-135 months to a range of 70-87
months and sentenced him to 70 months imprisonment. See id. at 1198-99.
257

258

263

See id. at 1203-04.

264

See id. at 1204-05.
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trust cases. 265 This precluded consideration of the loss of the medical license
as a basis for downward departure. 266
The circuit court's reasoning ignores Koon's instruction that the determination of whether a factor is prohibited "is limited to determining whether
the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the
factor. If the answer to the question is no-as it will be most of the timethe sentencing court" must consider the application of the factor to the particular case. 267 But for the odd facts of the Bernal case, the Eleventh Circuit

consistently upholds the uniformity model of sentencing. The Eleventh Circuit has ignored Koon and has categorically rejected potential factors, precluding the district courts from even arguing that the factor applies to an individual case.268
When the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits affirm downward departures, they do so without much analysis, and either with tremendous and
blind deference to district courts or with citation to Koon's discretion of language as their principal justification. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have specifically discussed the goal of uniformity in reversing the departures. 269 Although these courts have reached mixed results in deciding whether a given
situation falls outside the heartland, the opinions make no effort to bridge the
two worlds of individualization and uniformity in any principled way. The
rulings from these circuits that categorically reject factors as illegal offer another important contrast. While the Ninth Circuit decision in United States
v. Harris is respectful of Koon's admonition of the limited role of proscribed
1
27
factors, 270 the Eleventh Circuit's decisions are not.

265
266

See id.
See id. at 1206.

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996).
See UnitedStates v. Bush, 126 F.3d 1298, 1301 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a downward departure for aberrant behavior "will not normally be available" where
the "more minimal planning" enhancement is imposed); United States v. Phillips, 120
F.3d 227, 231-32 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that a downward departure cannot be used to
"circumvent the rule prohibiting a collateral attack on a prior conviction" used in the
criminal history calculation).
269 See supra notes 214-38 and accompanying text.
270 See Nos. 95-10506, 95-10551, 1997 WL 85569 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1997) (noting the
factors cited by the district court do not satisfy Koon either because they are "those that
make the case atypical, or have already been taken into account").
271 See supra notes 255-68 and accompanying text. There is a similar contrast between
the Fourth Circuit, see infra notes 272-302, which takes a view similar to the Eleventh,
and the Third Circuit, see infra notes 340-52, which joins the Ninth Circuit in offering
more careful analysis in this area.
267
268
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C. Discretion as Uniform Sentencing
1. The Fourth, First, Sixth, Eighth and Seventh Circuits
The seven remaining circuits, led by the Fourth Circuit, champion uniform sentencing by repeatedly supporting the Guideline ranges for offenses
over downward departures. The Fourth Circuit has reviewed sixteen downward departures since Koon, and in pursuing the Commission's aspiration of
keeping every case within the Guidelines, the court has eschewed Koon's fo272
cus on the history of discretion.
In United States v. Wilson, 273 the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's downward departure based on family circumstances. 274 Having
staked out very different ground from the Second Circuit on family circumstances departure before Koon, the court noted that it "has held improper departures based on [family circumstances], under circumstances much more
compelling than Wilson's." 275 In so doing, the Fourth Circuit uses the abuse
of discretion standard to exercise independent review and redecide the sentencing issue without giving any deference to the district court and without
elucidating any general standards. 276 The ruling effectively creates a per se
rule that family circumstances are not an allowable basis for departure by inferring that no case can ever present exceptional enough facts warranting a
departure.

See United States v. Banks, 130 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lathrop,
No. 96-4904, 1997 WL 639332 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 1997); United States v. Mudie, Nos.
96-4884, 96-4910, 1997 WL 633232 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 1997); United States v. Morin,
124 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lawrence, Nos. 97-4006, 97-4007, 1997
WL 563134 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1997); United States v. Gillespie, 121 F.3d 701, 1997 WL
499942 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 1997); United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429 (4th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Williams, Nos. 96-4258, 96-4309, 1997 WL 195918 (4th Cir. Apr. 23,
1997); United States v. Leasure, Nos. 96-4481, 96-4516, 1997 WL 137982 (4th Cir. Mar.
27, 1997); United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 512 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Stump, Nos. 96-4279, 96-4283, 1997 WL 20398 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 1997); United States v.
McHan, 101 F.3d 1027 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir.
1996); United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 1996), affirmed per curiam No. 974375, 1997 WL 791682 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1997); United States v. Hairston, 96 F.3d 102
(4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Weinberger, 91 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1996).
273 114 F.3d 429 (4th Cir. 1997).
274 See id. at 432-34. Wilson was convicted of selling crack cocaine in a total amount
272

of between 150 and 500 grams. See id. at 430. The district court cited the defendant's efforts to be a responsible teenage father as a basis for departure in a crack conspiracy
prosecution. See id. The court departed from the applicable guidelines range of 151-188
months to 121-151 months and imposed a 130 month sentence. See id. at 430-431.
275 Id. at 434 (citing pre-Koon Fourth Circuit cases).
276 See Post, supra note 2, at 213-18 (discussing the proper forms of appellate review).
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United States v. Withers 277 offers a more detailed analysis of the Fourth
Circuit's choice of sentencing models. There the district court departed
downward based on "minimal participation" and diminished mental capac7
ity.2 8 The circuit court reversed the sentencing decision in two steps, first
by adopting a more restrictive legal standard for the particular departure
factor, 279 then by analyzing the case at hand. The Fourth Circuit rejected the
district court's factual finding of depression as unsupported by the evidence. 280 Characterizing the defendant as suffering from "emotional problems and not from any diminished mental capacity," 28' the court explicitly
rejected departure, noting that "[i]f we were to approve the application of the
diminished capacity departure in this case, we-would be holding that anyone
who could point to a sufficiently tragic event in his or her life would be eligible for a sentence reduction." 282 Disagreeing with the Second Circuit's
willingness to let district judges exercise primary authority to control the
flow of departures, 283 the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit's
decision in United States v. Pullen,284 which limited such departures because
they "'would resurrect the pre-guidelines regime of discretionary sentencing.'"285 Emphasizing the goal of reducing disparity, and rejecting the individualized sentencing model realizable through deference to the district
court, the opinion closes with this warning:
To manipulate the Guidelines will reduce them to a sham set of rules
which would exacerbate the very problem they were designed to correct-unconstrained discretionary sentencing. We decline to endorse an
approach that would again reduce sentencing to a game of roulette in

277

100

F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 1996).

278 Id. at 1144. Withers was convicted of importing heroin into the United States. See

id. The district court reduced her sentence from a guideline range of 121-151 months to a
range of 37-46 months pursuant to GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (minimal participation)
and § 5K2.13 (diminished capacity).
279 The court adopted the views of other circuits by requiring the defendant to be suffering something greater than emotional problems or hardship. See Withers, 100 F.3d at
1147-48. Moreover, the defendant must demonstrate that his or her "significantly reduced
mental capacity bears a causal relationship to the crime," and show "an inability to process information or reason." Id. at 1148.
280 See id.
281

Id.

Id. Compare this reasoning to the Second Circuit's rejection of floodgates reasoning
in United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1997). See supra notes 201-06 and
accompanying text. The floodgates argument rejects every effort at individualization as
the tip of the wedge that will overwhelm uniformity.
283 See supra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.
284 89 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1996).
285 Withers, 100 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Pullen, 89 F.3d at 371).
282
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which the length of the sentence is determined by the draw of the
judge.286

In United States v. Hairston,287 the Fourth Circuit applied Koon to reverse
a district court departure based on extraordinary restitution. 288 In reversing,
the court found "no case in which such a small percentage in restitution has
been held to constitute an exceptional circumstance." 28 9 Suggesting a rule
for evaluating restitution cases, the court noted that "[c]ourts have generally
found restitution in amounts greater than that stolen to be a possible ground
for departure." 29° Moreover, the court recognized that "exceptional acceptance of responsibility might be indicated by partial restitution gained
through especially hard work,"293 but found no evidence of such exceptional
acceptance in this case. 292 Although the case suggests what might be exceptional, it does not defer to the district court's determination that individualization was warranted in this case.
United States v. Rybicki, 293 a case the Supreme Court had remanded for
reconsideration in light of Koon, similarly defers to the Guidelines rather
than the district court. 294 On remand, the Fourth Circuit adhered to its earlier decision, with only a one paragraph rejection of family circumstances
and military service as a basis for departure, claiming that the record did not
indicate these discouraged factors were present to an "exceptional" degree. 295 Here again, the reviewing court substituted its own judgment for the
district court's evaluation of whether a factor was exceptional. However,
whether a factor is exceptional is precisely the determination that Koon mandated the district judges decide and appellate judges uphold if the district

186 Id. at 1149 (citation omitted).
287 96 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1996).
288 See id. at 104-05. Hairston had plead guilty to bank fraud and at sentencing argued
that her efforts at restitution warranted a departure from the Guidelines. See id. at 104.
The district court found that but for her extraordinary efforts, the bank would not have
recovered any of its loss. See id. Therefore, the court departed downward five levels,
from a range of 24-30 months and ultimately imposed a sentence of six months and supervised release. See id. at 104-05.
289 Id. at 108 (noting that Hairston had repaid less than half of what she embezzled).
290 Id.
291 Id.

292 See id. at 109.
293 96 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 1996).
294 See id.

295 See id. at 759. The Fourth Circuit again remanded the case for consideration of
whether Rybicki's sentence should be enhanced for obstruction of justice. See id. at 760.
On remand, the district court did not impose an obstruction enhancement and sentenced
Rybicki to 18 months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release; the
court of appeals affirmed this decision. See United States v. Rybicki, No. 97-4375, 1997
WL 791682 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1997).
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judges do not abuse discretion. Koon's procedural holding is simply too
weak to compel courts of appeals that support uniformity to shift back, to
any significant degree, toward individualized sentencing.
In four other post-Koon cases, the Fourth Circuit promoted uniform sentencing by ruling that a given factor is not a legally permissible basis for departure. 296 In Perkins, the court of appeals denied a departure finding that
the Guidelines define sentencing disparity and that relative differences among
co-defendants are not permissible factors. 297 In McHan, the court determined that a previously completed sentence for a conviction that served as a
predicate crime in the defendant's continuing criminal enterprise could not
serve as a factor warranting a downward departure. 298 In Stump, the circuit
court reversed a departure following Stump's conviction for possession of
silencers, finding that the district court's ruling that the defendant possessed
the silencers for a brief period and a sporting purpose was a forbidden factor. 299 Stump expressly ignored Koon's directive that only the Sentencing
Commission can create forbidden factors and then, only by express direction. 3°° Moreover, the Fourth Circuit confused the reach of the applicable
statute with the issue of whether the particular conduct was outside the
heartland of the guideline, as this conduct may have been. The circuit court
also misconstrued the Guidelines in Weinberger.30 In finding restitution to
be a forbidden factor, the Weinberger court quoted a pre-Koon case, "[g]iven
the comprehensive sentencing structure embodied in the guidelines, '[o]nly
rarely will we conclude that a factor was not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission. "302
The First Circuit has taken a similarly dim view of district court discretion, reversing both downward departure cases it has reviewed since Koon.
In United States v. Dethlefs, 30 3 the district court departed because the defen3°4
dants' guilty pleas allowed significant conservation of judicial resources.
The First Circuit professed to follow Koon by distinguishing between the legal question of whether the grounds are permissible and the discretionary

296 See United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 512 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Stump,
Nos. 96-4279, 96-4283, 1997 WL 20398 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 1997); United States v.
McHan, 101 F.3d 1027 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Weinberger, 91 F.3d 642 (4th
Cir. 1996).
297 See Perkins, 108 F.3d at 515-16.
298 See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1040.
299 See Stump, 1997 WL 20398 at *1.
300 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996).
301 91 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1996).
302 Id. at 644 (quoting United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1149 (4th Cir. 1994)).

The court emphatically stated that Weinberger was "not one of those rare cases." Id.
303 123 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 1997).
304 Seeid. at41.
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judgment to depart once such grounds are found. 305 Although it agreed that
a timely guilty plea did conserve judicial resources and thereby facilitated the
administration of justice, nonetheless it was an "unmentioned" factor, using
the Koon vocabulary, and as such, in light of the "structure 3°6and theory" of
the Guidelines, could be considered in the decision to depart.
In the very next section of the opinion, the Dethlefs court emphatically
rejected the district court's evaluation of the judicial conservation factor under the circumstances of the case, finding that the sentencing court had an
insufficient factual predicate to depart. 30 7 The court noted that "[t]his case
does not appear to present problems so out of the ordinary as to pluck it from
the mainstream."308 Thus, the defendants' guilty pleas provided only a readily foreseeable level of facilitation of judicial administration, a level "well
shy of what is necessary to take a case out of the heartland. "39 In other
words, the First Circuit allowed consideration of an unmentioned factor, but
found the facts of the particular case not worthy of a departure.
In United States v. Brennick,310 the First Circuit reversed a downward de-

parture granted to a defendant convicted of tax evasion, structuring, and obstruction crimes. 3 1' The district court had departed downward based on its
determination that the defendant genuinely intended to pay the required taxes
at some point and that the ultimate tax losses to the government attributed to
the defendant were overstated due to contributing causes not within his control. 312 Mentioning Koon only in passing, 313 the First Circuit concluded that
the district court paid inadequate attention to the factors weighing against any
departure, particularly a departure of the degree granted by the sentencing
court. 314 The First Circuit's rulings follow a similar pattern in which reviewing courts reevaluate, with little explanation or analysis, the very issue

305 See id. at 43-44.
306 See id. at 46. The court explained, "We read Koon to mean that courts, as a general rule, should not categorically reject any factors (save only forbidden factors and factors which lack relevance) as possible bases for departures." Id. (citing Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 108-09 (1996)).
307 See id. at 47.
308 Id. at 48.
309 Id. at 49.
310 134 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1998).
31' See id. at 13.
312 See id. The guideline range for Brennick was 41-51 months; he received a 13month sentence, which was the midpoint in the range for a first offender who caused
$40,000 in government tax losses, absent any other adjustments. See id. at 16. Brennick
caused the government a tax loss of over $1.5 million. See id.
313 See id. "[Tihe quid pro quo for departures is reviewability, including review for
abuse of discretion, and even if review is hedged by deference, it has to mean something."
Id. (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996)).
314 See id. at 16-17.
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that Koon left to the district court judge's discretion: the "exceptionalness"
of the departure factor under all the circumstances of the case.
The Sixth Circuit has made its commitment to the uniform model of sentencing clear. In United States v. Barajas-Nunez,315 the circuit court found
the district court's reliance on an improper factor to be plain error, permitting review in the absence of a timely government objection. 316 The court
remanded the case, instructing the district court to determine whether it
would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the impermissible factors, specifically his inability to speak English and his lack of education as grounds for a diminished mental capacity departure. 31 7 In finding that
the error affected substantial rights, the court of appeals concluded that if the
defendant's improper lower sentence stood, it "would fly in the face of one
of the primary purposes of the sentencing guidelines-the elimination of disparities in sentencing."318 Thus, the Sixth Circuit chose uniformity over individualization. The Sixth Circuit has upheld this reasoning in reversing two
other downward departures.
315

319

91 F.3d 826 (6th Cir. 1996). The defendant was convicted of illegal reentry after

deportation after an aggravated felony. See id. at 828. The district court departed from
57-71 months of imprisonment to eight months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release, after which defendant would be deported again. See id. at 829. At the time
of the appeal, the defendant had completed his sentence and had been deported, although
he had re-entered the country and been arrested again. See id.
316 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (permitting a reviewing court to review issues forfeited
by lack of timely objection if the error is plain and affects substantial rights); United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993) (discussing forfeiture of errors and the plain error
doctrine).
317 See Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d at 834.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that "BarajasNunez's inability to speak English and lack of formal education do not affect [his] ability
to process information or to reason" and "[tihus, these factors do not constitute significantly reduced mental capacity as a matter of law." Id. at 831. The court deemed a defendant's inability to speak English a forbidden basis for departure, while a lack of formal
education is a discouraged ground for departure. See id. at 831-32. Although the court
recognized that lack of education could be present to such an exceptional degree as to constitute a permissible departure factor, the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's equation
of lack of education with diminished mental capacity in the instant case. See id. at 832.
The district court also cited the "lesser harms" guideline as a justification for a downward
departure, finding that the defendant believed that his pregnant girlfriend was in danger of
physical harm and re-entered the country, thereby committing a crime, to avoid a perceived greater harm. See id. (citing GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.11). On this point, the
circuit court followed Koon's admonition regarding the deference due to the sentencing
court, although it believed the district court's findings did not justify a departure. See id.
318

Id. at 833.

319

See United States v. Weaver, 126 F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 1997) (vacating and re-

manding for resentencing where court granted downward departure on basis of guidelines'
disproportionately harsh treatment of relatively minor white-collar offenders as compared
with more serious white-collar offenders); United States v. Gaines, 122 F.3d 324, 330 (6th
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals shares the willingness of the First,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits to scrutinize the district judge's finding that a departure factor was exceptional. It has reversed all of the post-Koon downward departures it has reviewed. 320 In United States v. Weise, 32 1 the circuit
court disagreed with the district court's evaluation of factors it relied on in
departing from the Guideline range.322 The court remanded the case for additional findings on one departure ground, the defendant's struggle to lead a
decent life in the difficult environment of an Indian reservation, and rejected
on a second ground, the aberrational nature of the conduct. 323 The dissent
findargued that Koon required substantial deference to the district court's
32 4
possess."
court's
district
the
advantage
"institutional
the
to
ings, due
After the district court departed downward on the same two grounds on
remand, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for resentencing,
admonishing the district court for again departing on the aberrant behavior
basis, after foreclosing that approach in the first appeal. 325 The circuit court
also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting the
downward departure based on Weise's triumph over the difficulties of reservation life, as none of the factors the sentencing court relied on was present
326
to an exceptional degree.
Similarly, in United States v. Kapitzke, 327 the Eighth Circuit ruled that departure was unwarranted because three of the four factors the district court
relied upon-family circumstances, susceptibility to abuse in prison and the
negative impact incarceration would have on the defendant's rehabilitationwere not exceptional or extraordinary. 328 Although the majority found the
Cir. 1997) (rejecting downward departure on the basis of disparities inherent in guidelines'
100:1 crack and powder cocaine ratio).
320 See United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Drew,
131 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kapitzke, 130 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Wind, 128 F.3d 1276 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bing Wong, 127
F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kalb, 105 F.3d 426 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Weise, 89 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1996), on remand sub nom. United States v.
Weise, 128 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1997).
321 89 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1996).
322 See id. at 507.
323 See id. The circuit court rejected the district court's determination that Weise's
criminal conduct was aberrant, finding his actions neither spontaneous nor thoughtless, the
standard for aberrant behavior. See id. (citing United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161,
164 (8th Cir. 1991)).
324 Id. at 510 (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996)).
325 See United States v. Weise, 128 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1997).
326 See id. at 674-75. These factors included the "extraordinary problems and difficulties [Weise] struggled against and overcame on the [reservation]," as well as Weise's employment history, family ties, and reputation in the community. Id. at 674.
327 130 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997).
328 See id. at 822-23.
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record insufficient to justify the departure, 329 the dissent argued that Koon
affirmed that same departure ground on the same kind of record. 330 Judge
of
Arnold, in dissent, cited Koon's observation that this "'was just the sort 331
determination that must be accorded deference by the appellate courts."'
Despite Koon's mandate, the Eighth Circuit' has joined the other circuits in
independently reviewing the district court's departure decisions based on ex332
ceptional factors.
The Seventh Circuit has reviewed only one district court downward departure since Koon. In United States v. Besler,333 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals remanded an encouraged factor departure after determining that
the record was inadequate to permit review of whether the legal requirements
of the guideline section were met. 334 However, the Seventh Circuit has otherwise indicated very strong support for the uniform application of the
Guidelines. In United States v. Pullen, 335 a defendant challenged the district
court's refusal to grant a downward departure based on a history of sexual
abuse that the defendant claimed affected his mental condition. 33 6 On re337
view, writing for the court, Judge Posner offered an advisory opinion,

329 See id. at 821 (noting that the record did no more than show Kapitzke was in a
class'-child pornographers-subject to abuse in prison).
330 See id. at 824 (Arnold, J., dissenting) (citing Koon's affirming a downward departure based purely on Officers Koon and Powell's membership in a class-police officerssubject to abuse in prison).
331Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 112
(1996).
332 However, the Eighth Circuit did affirm one downward departure ground in
Kapitzke, noting that "we are dealing with a fact-based judgment that falls within the district court's sentending discretion." Id.
13 86 F,3d 745 (7th Cir. 1996).
334See id. at 748. The district court departed downward based on Besler's voluntary
disclosure of his activities. See id. The Guidelines permit a departure on this ground if
the defendant's disclosure occurs "prior to the discovery of such offense, and if such offense was unlikely to have been discovered otherwise." GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.16.
Although the circuit court found insufficient findings by the trial court to support departure, it professed to "express no opinion as to whether the evidence before the district
court would support a finding that discovery was unlikely, nor whether the district court
could without abusing its discretion base a downward departure on some other provision."
Besler, 86 F.3d at 748.
335 89 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1996).
336 See id. at 369-70.
337A district court's denial of a request to grant a downward departure is usually affirmed on the grounds that refusal to depart is not reviewable, see, e.g., United States v.
McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 729 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 345
(2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Wright, 37 F.3d 358, 361 (7th Cir. 1994), unless the case
presents the question of whether the departure grounds are legally permissible, see, e.g.,
United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 345 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Jones, 55 F.3d
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warning that use of individualized sentences based on family history would
338
cause the Guidelines to be "unraveled before the eyes of the judge."
Judge Posner suggested that only the sentencing commission can decide how
" 339
to account for family circumstances and "[t]he individual judge cannot.
2. The Third and D.C. Circuits: A More Moderate Uniformity
The Third Circuit has reversed the only two post-Koon downward departures it has reviewed, finding in both that the factors relied upon by the dis-.
trict court in departing were legally impermissible. 340 The circuit court did
indicate some willingness to individualize sentences, however, by including a
suggestion to consider an alternate departure ground when it remanded one
case. 341 In United States v. Romualdi,342 the court held that a defendant con-

victed of possession of child pornography was not entitled to a downward
departure by analogy to a guideline provision permitting an adjustment for
minor participants in an offense.

343

The reviewing court distinguished

Romualdi's case, involving an individual crime, from a pre-Koon case permitting departure where the defendant was a minor participant in concerted
activity.3

44

289, 292 (7th Cir. 1995). Pullen was argued before Koon was decided, but the opinion
recognized that under Koon, the ground for departure urged by the defendant is not a legally prohibited factor. See Pullen, 89 F.3d at 371. Although the appellate court should
have remanded the case to the district court to determine if this case warranted departure,
the opinion offered the advisory ruling that a departure in this case "would have been an
abuse of discretion." Id. at 372.
338 Pullen, 89 F.3d at 371.
339 Id. at 372.

340 See United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Romualdi, 101 F.3d 971, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1996).
341 See Rotnualdi, 101 F.3d at 976-77 (noting that the district court "may want to consider" whether the defendant's six month home confinement warranted a departure).
342 101 F.3d 971 (3rd Cir. 1996).
343 An adjustment is a change in guideline range by operation of a specific rule, while a
departure simply takes the case outside the rules. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.I(c)
(after determining base level offense, the judge should "apply the adjustment as appropriate related to the victim, role and obstruction of justice"); id. § 3B1.2 ("Mitigating Role")
("Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level" if the defendant
was a minimal or minor participant in any criminal act.).
344 See United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1990). Bierley was convicted
of receipt of child pornography. See id. at 1064. Bierley was the only participant in the
crime because the postal inspector who sent the child pornography could not be held
criminally responsible in the offense. See id. at 1065. The district court held that Bierley
was not entitled to a downward departure as a minor or minimal participant in the offense
under GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 because that guideline requires another "participant"
to whom the defendant can be compared. See id. at 1065-66. The Third Circuit reversed,
holding that the Guideline could be applied by analogy and instructed the district court that
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The court then set forth the Koon analytical framework of encouraged,
discouraged and unmentioned factors, suggesting that the district court consider whether Romualdi's completion of six months of home confinement
consisted of an "unmentioned" factor warranting departure. 345 Although the
third circuit emphasized that the inquiry was "primarily within the discretion
of the sentencing court,"346 it went on to repeat Koon's admonition that
"departures based on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be 'highly
infrequent. '" 347 Thus, Romualdi displays an appealing honesty within the
doctrinal incoherence of this area. The reviewing court clearly distinguished
between its de novo review of whether the ground is legally permissible and
the discretionary determination of whether or not some factor is exceptional,
given all the circumstances of the case. However, it left unresolved the
question of what makes a sentence appropriate.
The Third Circuit also reversed a downward departure in United States v.
Haut,348 holding that the district court erred when it reduced the defendants'
sentences based on its determination that the prosecution's trial witnesses
lacked credibility, despite the defendant's conviction by the jury. 349 The reviewing court categorically rejected the district court's downward departure
on that basis, reasoning that "necessarily embedded in the heartland of every
guideline is the assumption that individuals sentenced under it have been
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 350 The district court independently
assessed the credibility of witnesses and gave effect to those judgments
through the severity of the sentences imposed, although it refused to enter a
judgment of acquittal. 3 5' Permitting a district court to carve out space for a
case in which a judgment of acquittal is not required as a matter of law, but
doubt about the trial evidence renders the guideline sentence too harsh
would, as the reviewing court noted, "sap the integrity of both the Guidelines
352
and the jury system.
The District of Columbia Circuit has reversed the one downward departure it has reviewed. In United States v. Atkins, 353 the district court placed
the defendant on probation after it found that he was suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder, and therefore felt compelled to carry the weapon
it could depart from the applicable sentence if the court believed that'Bierley would have
been a minor or minimal participant had the postal inspector been a participant. See id.

3'5See Romualdi, 101 F.3d at 976-77.
346 Id. at 976.
341Id. (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (quoting
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A)).
107 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 1997).
id. at 219.
350 Id.
351See id. at 222-23.
352 Id.
353 116 F.3d 1566 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
348

349See
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he was convicted of possessing. 354 The sentencing court relied upon the encouraged "diminished capacity" departure factor 355 after finding no need to
incarcerate the defendant to protect the public. 356 The district court also reto
lied upon a miscalculation in a prior sentence and the defendant's failure
357
violently attack law enforcement officers despite repeated opportunities.
In an opinion that attends carefully to the record in the particular case, the
358
D.C. Circuit found that the sentencing court had abused its discretion.
Although lower courts have the authority to depart if a defendant's mental
disorder makes him or her. less dangerous than others, 35 9 "[a]bsent a finding
that Atkins would in fact receive (or even seek) treatment ...

his condition's

" 36°

Similarly, the court held that
amenability to treatment has no relevance.
the district court's findings that Atkins' age was a mitigating factor was insufficient because it was supported only by general observations about age
and criminality, not particularized findings relevant to the progress of this
361
specific defendant's mental illness over time.
The D.C. Circuit also ruled that the district court improperly relied upon a
miscalculation of an earlier sentence as a grounds for departure, holding that
"[the remedy for an error occurring in a different court lies with that court
or the appropriate appellate court, not collaterally with the district court. "362
Finally, the circuit court noted Atkins' history of "violent resistance to arrest, hostage-taking and armed threats against law enforcement" 363 militated
in favor of incarceration, rejecting the sentencing court's finding that Atkins
did not actually injure law enforcement officers and therefore deserved a
downward departure. 364 The opinion closed by noting that while Koon requires deference, the trial court's decision in this case presented an abuse of
discretion in both its consideration of improper factors and its inappropriate
365
weighing of the legitimate factors presented.

3

See id. at 1568.

§ 5K2.13 (allowing downward departure for "significantly
reduced mental capacity" but forbidding it if the court finds a need to protect the public
from the defendant).
356 See Atkins, 116 F.3d at 1568 (noting the treatability of the illness and the defendant's advanced age upon release).
357 See id.
358 See id. at 1571.
311 See GUIDELINES MANUAL

319

See id. at 1569.

360 Id. at 1570.
361 See id. at 1570-71 (noting, as well, that the "Guidelines, indicate a general reluc-

tance to place much weight on age").
362 id. at 1571.
363 Id.
36 See id. (concluding that this district court decision was an abuse of discretion).
365

See id.
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In sum, these post-Koon downward departure cases decided by the various
United States courts of appeals demonstrate that problematic discretion in
federal sentencing still exists. In these cases, the identity of the reviewing
court is often all too important in determining the outcome, a problem the
Guidelines' goal of uniformity meant to resolve. Although some courts are
struggling to analyze particular cases and understand their role in reviewing
discretion under the Guidelines, too many are fighting a different battle.
CONCLUSION

Ten years after the Sentencing Reform Act, the Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit are still defending and applying the unreviewable, standardless judicial power to individualize punishment that characterized old sentencing law, while the Sentencing Commission and the Fourth Circuit continue to inveigh against it. 3 66 While the Supreme Court states that case
specific factual judgments are simply in the nature of sentencing, the Sentencing Commission views them as temporary blemishes in a perfectible
structure. The Second Circuit has yet to set any limits, permitting its judges
to individualize so long as they do not go too far beyond the last case. 367 On
the other hand, the Fourth Circuit views any individualization as reducing
the Guidelines
to a "sham" 368 and sending us back to the old law game of
"roulette." 369 Both sides of this debate miss the fact that the focus should be
on how reviewable discretion can further justice in particular cases.
Our experience with the Guidelines shows that judges use their limited
discretion to individualize in only approximately ten percent of the cases,
while seventy percent of the cases are sentenced within the Guideline
range. 370 Despite those who predict doom, like Judge Posner in the Pullen
case, 371 the current system has managed to combine rule-determined sentencing with a measure of reviewable individualization for the past ten years.
But appellate case law has not been able to express a clear view of the pragmatic coexistence of limited, reviewable discretion to individualize sentences
with a system of detailed rules. This has led to circuit courts doing a very
poor job explaining why a given case comes out as it does. 372
31 See supra Parts III-IV.
367

See supra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.

368

United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1149 (4th Cir. 1996).

369

Id.; see also supra notes 272-302 and accompanying text.

370See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
311See United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the

"fundamental goal" of the SRA, placing federal sentencing on an "objective, uniform, and

rational basis" would be contravened if departure were allowed for ordinary, rather than
exceptional, cases).
372

See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 14 (arguing that appellate judges have been denied

the opportunity to develop a principled sentencing jurisprudence by the Commission's micro-management of sentencing); Reitz supra note 62, at 1465-71 (criticizing the federal
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Instead of discussing the particular case at hand, circuit courts have
adopted one of the two categorical-and unhelpful-approaches discussed
above. Courts either raise the specter of disparity to deny individualization
or wave the flag of discretion to affirm it. District judges, however, need
clearer guidance than a general sense of whether their particular appellate
court will affirm or deny their decision, on appeal. Individual appellate
opinions are a particularly bad vehicle for imposing discipline over 40,000 or
so sentences that will be imposed this year, 373 but they are well suited to exploring the reasons that a given case does or does not merit individualization. 374 Neither the Supreme Court, nor the courts of appeals have met that

challenge.
The Supreme Court, in Koon, failed to seize the opportunity to step beyond the categorical approach that reflects the old debate about unlimited and
unreviewed discretion. Although the Court's desire to reinvigorate judicial
sentencing discretion is evident from Koon's rhetoric of discretion, 375 the
opinion's failure to come to grips with the fundamental change in the nature
of judicial discretion under the Guidelines renders its procedural approach
impotent. Instead, the Supreme Court should acknowledge that the SRA
fundamentally altered the exercise of sentencing discretion and discuss the
role of reviewable, limited individualization under the Guidelines.
The Court must forthrightly remind reviewing courts that the role of abuse
of discretion review under the Guidelines is to limit and channel individualization, not eliminate it. Although Congress did not completely abandon individualized sentencing, it now plays only a subsidiary role in the larger

courts for taking a high enforcement/low judicial creativity approach in the guidelines
area).
373 There are too many cases, issues, and jurisdictions for the Fourth Circuit's uniformity rhetoric to change the national departure practices. Even within each circuit, the
low likelihood of government appeal makes appellate case law a relatively weak check on
the overall rate of departures. The Sentencing Commission, charged with collecting data
and conducting ongoing evaluations of the Guidelines and empowered to amend them,
would be the ideal institution to focus on the overall picture, had it not proven itself so
devoted to minutiae and resistant to input. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 14, at 126977 (detailing the ways the Commission has resisted an increased judicial role by making
the Guidelines very detailed and amending them to overrule court decisions reading them
more broadly).
314 The Pullen case offers just the opposite view, suggesting that the Commission must
make general rules about how a factor, such as a defendant's history of physical abuse,
should factor into sentencing. See supra notes 335-45 and accompanying text. But Koon
eschews those general rules, holding that case by case judgments are required. See supra
notes 157-62 and accompanying text. Although case by case judgment is required by the
regime of limited discretion, the Guidelines' inconsistent principles, and, most importantly, the language of the statute, this Article has argued that Koon is wrong to require
case by case judgment inherent in criminal sentencing.
375 See supra note 182 (commentators discussing Koon's rhetoric of discretion).
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sentencing structure that emphasizes uniformity. Indeed, appellate review of
sentences individualized by downward departure introduced a unifying element to even these individualized cases-district court decisions must withstand appellate scrutiny. Yet even with all those qualifications, a place still
remains for the discretion to individualize sentences. The larger question is
how courts should decide when the rules to individualize do not fit the case.
In the end, the Sentencing Guidelines have reduced, but not eliminated,
the exercise of judgment in sentencing. Given the Guidelines' internal inconsistencies and the compromises upon which they are founded, no single
reigning idea behind sentencing emerges against which every downward departure can be judged. 376 Sentencing courts must make judgments about
whether the case at hand falls outside the "heartland," and reviewing courts
must evaluate that particular judgment. This Article has argued that the history of unfettered sentencing discretion has made reviewing courts unnecessarily wary about the exercise of reviewable discretion under the Guidelines.
Their reluctant step away from the categorical approach ignores the analytic
differences between the unreviewable and largely standardless discretion of
the old system and the reviewable and channeled discretion of the Guidelines. If that theoretical difference is not enough to stop courts from citing
the parade of horribles associated with old law sentencing, our ten years of
experience with the Guidelines' combination of rules and limited discretion
proves that departures will not swallow rules in this system.
The Guidelines may not be the best possible sentencing system, but they
have reached a reasonable and relatively stable balance between uniformity
and individualization. 377 Given that relative stability, the courts of appeals
should abandon the rhetoric of competing models of sentencing and accept
the typically judicial task of reviewing individual cases. Although Koon
muddied the waters by conflating different kinds of judicial discretion, it
clearly directs courts to separate out the legal, and generalizable question of
the permissibility of a given departure factor from the factual and case specific inquiry into whether a given factor is exceptional in a given case. Obviously, courts should follow Koon 's legal framework in deciding whether a
given factor may be a basis for departure. Some courts of appeals, perhaps
motivated by their attachment to either individualized or uniform sentencing
have not followed Koon in that regard, but the problem of bending legal

As this Article has argued, that conclusion flows from the particular rules we have,
not from any fundamental view on the nature of sentencing. We could have a system of
mandatory sentences for every offense, or guidelines without departures, or other categorical, inflexible approaches.
371 The debate continues over whether there should be a greater role for individualization in sentencing. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 170 (1995) (arguing for increased individualization of sentencing,
"by loosen[ing] up sentencing laws and guidelines in order to let judges more often mitigate sentences to take account of offenders' personal circumstances").
376
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doctrine to accommodate policy concerns is not unique to federal sentencing
law.
The new challenge posed by Koon is how to give substance to the deferential review of the district court's decision on case specific factors underlying departures. Too often, abuse of discretion review of downward departures is little more than a ruling without reasoning; a mere recitation of the
district court's reasons followed by a statement of agreement or disagreement. Reviewing courts must wade into the messy business of opining about
the merits of particular sentences, for in the end the test of whether a given
factor is exceptional given all the circumstances of the case is a test of the
appropriateness of the sentence. Reviewing courts must explain why, giving
deference to the trial court determination, the sentence in a particular case is
just or unjust.
These explanations should not announce, or advance, sentencing theories.
They should address the narrower question of the sentence at issue. The current style of review attends far too much to the old debate between the sentencing theories of uniformity and individualization. Koon counsels a deferential, case specific and factually rooted review of the few cases that have
been identified as likely instances of individualization within a system of unifying rules and principles. Although individual cases may not, by themselves, each provide satisfactory vehicles for elucidating broad guiding principles, the complex mix of levels and kinds of judicial discretion and review
in the current sentencing law offers a chance to develop a common law
which moves beyond the antinomy of uniformity and individualization to a
set of sentencing norms that could offer useful, if not completely theoretically satisfying guidance.
Pound and Rosenberg, among others, remind us that some cases require
the exercise of discretion because we believe the rules simply don't fit the
case. Despite the Commission's rhetoric, current sentencing law reflects
Congressional judgment that the Guidelines will not fit every case. In this
sentencing regime, the judicial task is only to explain why strict application
of the rules is not appropriate for the case at hand, not to fight old battles
when deciding a case under new law. The judicial task is not to use the lessons of the old region when deciding a case.

